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A PATH TO PURPOSIVE FORMALISM:
INTERPRETING CHAPTER III FOR JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY
REBECCA WELSH*
The interpretation of the separation of federal judicial power derived from 
Chapter III of the Constitution is as hotly debated as it is fundamentally 
important. Two key viewpoints have emerged in this debate, formalism 
and functionalism. A formalist test focusing on defi nitional characteristics 
governs the permissible powers of federal courts. A functionalist test 
looking to whether a power is incompatible with institutional independence 
and integrity limits the powers of State courts and of judges personae
designatae. A rare point of consensus between the two viewpoints, and the
central pillar of my critique, is that Chapter III is purposive and should be 
interpreted to achieve judicial independence and impartiality. This paper 
queries which method of interpretation can best achieve the independence 
and impartiality of the federal judicature. The analysis highlights the 
inherent strengths and weaknesses of each approach and ultimately leads 
to the identifi cation of a preferred approach I call ‘purposive formalism’. 
Purposive formalism is a two-tiered method harnessing the strict formalist 
framework and a compatibility test. It is proposed as a legitimate and 
signifi cant step forward in the interpretation of Chapter III to achieve the 
independence and impartiality of the federal judicature.
I  INTRODUCTION
This article investigates which method of interpreting Chapter III of the
Constitution best achieves judicial independence and impartiality. From its
earliest stages, the Australian Constitution was intended to create and maintain an
independent and impartial federal judicature.1 It is through judicial independence
and impartiality that fundamental constitutional aims are achieved. These aims
1 James Stellios, The Federal Judicature: Chapter III of the Constitution (LexisNexis Butterworths,
2010) 69–72, 96–102. See also Offi cial Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, 
Adelaide, 20 April 1897, 950 (Josiah Symon); Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909)
8 CLR 330, 382 (Isaacs J) (‘Huddart Parker’); Waterside Workers’ Federation of Australia v JW 
Alexander Ltd (1918) 25 CLR 434, 469–70 (Isaacs and Rich JJ) (‘Alexander’s Case’).
* PhD Candidate, Research Associate and Sessional Lecturer, Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law,
Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales. The author is indebted to Professor George Williams
AO and his Laureate Fellowship Project, ‘Anti-Terror Laws and the Democratic Challenge’, and also
to Professor Andrew Lynch and other members of the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law for their 
feedback and support. Thanks also to Sir Anthony Mason AC KBE CBE and Associate Professor James
Stellios for their insightful input on earlier ideas behind this article. The failings and fl aws in this piece
are entirely my own.
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include: providing a judicial check and balance on government power through
robust judicial review;2 preserving representative and responsible government 
by preventing unrepresentative judges from exercising political functions;3
maintaining equality between citizens and polities in the federation;4 maintaining
the federal compact;5 and upholding the rights and liberties of citizens.6 As
Professor Ralf Dahrendorf observes, judicial independence ‘may indeed be
regarded as the very defi nition of the “rule of law”; it is certainly an important 
part of it. … [T]he partisan administration of law is in fact the perversion of law,
and the denial of the rule of law’.7 To adopt the words of the New Zealand Law
Commission, judicial independence and impartiality ‘are the pillars on which
justice according to the law stands’.8
It is not merely the actuality of independence and impartiality that the separation
of powers is designed to achieve, but the perception of it.9 This much has been
acknowledged by the High Court in its references to the need to maintain ‘public
confi dence’ in the independent judicature.10 Public confi dence in this context 
must be understood as an objectively assessable standard. Some emphasise the
centrality of fair process to perceived independence and impartiality, observing
that the powers of courts to protect their own processes maintain public confi dence
2 H P Lee and Enid Campbell, The Australian Judiciary (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2012) 3;
A-G (Cth) v The Queen (1957) 95 CLR 529, 540–1 (Privy Council).
3 Sir Anthony Mason, ‘A New Perspective on Separation of Powers’ (1996) 82 Canberra Bulletin of 
Public Administration 1, 2; Peter Gerangelos, ‘Interpretational Methodology in Separation of Powers
Jurisprudence: The Formalist/Functionalist Debate’ (2005) 8 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 1,
3.
4 Lee and Campbell, above n 2, 3; Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs 
(1996) 189 CLR 1, 11 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ) (‘Wilson’).
5 Stellios, The Federal Judicature, above n 1, 69–72.
6 See, eg, Offi cial Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Adelaide, 20 April
1897, 950 (Josiah Symon); R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353, 381 (Kitto J); R v Quinn; Ex parte
Consolidated Food Corporation (1977) 138 CLR 1, 11 (Jacobs J) (‘Quinn’); Thomas v Mowbray (2007)
233 CLR 307, 414–5 (Kirby J) (‘Thomas’); Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 201 (Kirby J)
(‘Nicholas’); Wilson (1996) 189 CLR 1, 14 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ);
Martin H Redish, ‘Separation of Powers, Judicial Authority, and the Scope of Article III: The Troubling
Cases of Morrison and Mistretta’ (1989) 39 DePaul Law Review 299, 302; Sir John Laws, ‘The Good 
Constitution’ (2012) 71 Cambridge Law Journal 567, 574–5. 
7 Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘A Confusion of Powers: Politics and the Rule of Law’ (1977) 40 Modern Law Review
1, 9. As Professor Cheryl Saunders and Katherine Le Roy observe, ‘perhaps the central purpose [of 
judicial independence] — is the maintenance of the rule of law, however defi ned’: Cheryl Saunders and 
Katherine Le Roy, ‘Perspectives on the Rule of Law’ in Cheryl Saunders and Katherine Le Roy (eds),
The Rule of Law (Federation Press, 2003) 1, 2 (emphasis added).
8 New Zealand Law Commission, Towards a New Courts Act — A Register of Judges’ Pecuniary
Interests?, Issues Paper No 21 (2011) 4.
9 Stephen Parker, ‘The Independence of the Judiciary’ in Brian Opeskin and Fiona Wheeler (eds), The
Australian Federal Judicial System (Melbourne University Press, 2000) 62, 63.
10 Nicholas (1998) 193 CLR 173, 254 [201] (Kirby J); Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 116
(McHugh J) (‘Kable’); International Finance Trust Co Ltd v New South Wales Crime Commission
(2009) 240 CLR 319, 354 (French CJ) (‘International Finance Trust’); Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184
CLR 348, 365 (Brennan CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ) (‘Grollo’).
Monash University Law Review (Vol 39, No 1)68
in the administration of justice and are central to the constitutional conception of 
judicial power.11
The framers of the Constitution discussed the importance of judicial independence
and impartiality, and ensured fundamental protections for judicial tenure and 
remuneration were constitutionally enshrined. However, they shed little light 
on the degree of separation required between judicial and non-judicial powers
under the Constitution.12 The text of the Constitution does little to clarify this
ambiguity.13 From these uncertain foundations, the High Court has interpreted 
Chapter III to require a particularly strict separation of federal judicial powers,
forbidding judicial and non-judicial powers from being vested in the same
institution except in strictly limited circumstances.14
The separation of judicial power has now evolved as one of the most litigated 
aspects of Australian constitutional law. The interpretation of Chapter III in light 
of the text, structure, objects and purposes of the Constitution has been hotly
debated for a substantial part of Australia’s constitutional history. The growing
appreciation of Chapter III as a source of implied protections has only served 
to heighten this debate.15 Today, calls for the strict approach to the separation
of federal judicial power to be overruled and replaced with a more fl exible test 
continue to gather ground.
The primary aim of this article is to determine a preferred method of interpreting
Chapter III in light of its core purpose of achieving judicial independence and 
impartiality. The widely acknowledged purposive nature of Chapter III presents
a rare point of convergence between the main interpretational viewpoints.16
The purposive element of the separation of judicial power may be clear when
that element was clearly emphasised by the framers, or when the separation
of powers is forms a part of an unwritten constitutional system. However, the
purposive nature of the separation of powers is not diminished when the doctrine
is implied from the text of a written constitution; rather it ‘follows with it’.17
Likewise, this purposive nature does not fall by the wayside when a formalistic
separation is adopted, despite formalism’s apparently narrow focus on defi nitional
11 Nicholas (1998) 193 CLR 173, 209 (Gaudron J), 224, 226 (McHugh J), 258 (Kirby J); Wendy Lacey,
‘Inherent Jurisdiction, Judicial Power and Implied Guarantees under Chapter III of the Constitution’ 
(2003) 31 Federal Law Review 57, 76; Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181, 208 [44]
(French CJ and Kiefel J) (‘Wainohu’); Chris Steytler and Iain Field, ‘The “Institutional Integrity”
Principle: Where Are We Now, and Where Are We Headed?’ (2011) 35 University of Western Australia
Law Review 227, 231–2.
12 Fiona Wheeler, ‘Original Intent and the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers in Australia’ (1996) 7
Public Law Review 96; Fiona Wheeler, ‘The Boilermakers Case’ in H P Lee and George Winterton,
Australian Constitutional Landmarks (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 160, 161–2; Stellios, The 
Federal Judicature, above n 1, 69–72.
13 Constitution ss 1, 61, 71. Cf Constitution ss 64, 101.
14 Constitution s 64; Cheryl Saunders, ‘The Separation of Powers’ in Brian Opeskin and Fiona Wheeler 
(eds), The Australian Federal Judicial System (Melbourne University Press, 2000) 3, 8.
15 Fiona Wheeler, ‘Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the New High Court’ (2004) 32
Federal Law Review 205; R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254 
(‘Boilermakers’’).
16 Gerangelos, ‘Interpretational Methodology’, above n 3, 10.
17 M J C Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Liberty Fund, 2nd ed, 1998) 2.
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characteristics discussed below.18 As the separation of judicial power is designed 
to achieve judicial independence and impartiality, a method of constitutional
interpretation should be adopted that best achieves this aim.
Formalism and functionalism are the two key schools that have emerged to
analyse the interpretation of the constitutional separation of judicial power and 
they frame the present analysis.19 Formalism advocates the strict separation of 
functions based on their identifi cation as judicial, legislative or executive in nature.
In Australia the formalist approach is embodied in the primary interpretation of 
Chapter III which rests upon two rules, which I refer to as the two ‘separation
rules’. The fi rst separation rule is that judicial power be vested only in courts.
The second rule holds that federal courts are limited to the exercise of judicial
and incidental powers. Functionalism is more fl exible and therefore more diffi cult 
to defi ne at large. Essentially functionalism permits the conferral of powers on
institutions regardless of questions of defi nition, unless the conferral infringes
some other standard. In Australia the functionalist approach is embodied in
the adoption of an ‘incompatibility test’ whereby the judiciary is prevented 
only from exercising powers that undermine its independence or integrity. The
incompatibility test limits the permissible functions of state courts and of federal
judges acting in a personal capacity (‘personae designatae’). Many of Australia’s
leading constitutionalists have called for a functionalist incompatibility test to
replace the formalist separation rule preventing federal courts from exercising
non-judicial powers.20
In Parts II and III, I critique the success of the formalist separation rules and 
functionalist incompatibility test in achieving judicial independence and 
impartiality, respectively. The critique of formalism and functionalism in their 
separate contexts underpins the identifi cation of a preferred approach of ‘purposive
formalism’ in Part IV. Purposive formalism harnesses some of the functionalist 
test’s strengths to overcome key weaknesses in the formalist separation rules.
In doing so, purposive formalism also addresses the weaknesses inherent in the
functionalist test. The proposed approach is presented not as an ideal method,
but as a step forward in the development of Chapter III jurisprudence and in the
achievement of the independence and impartiality of federal courts.
This article has a fairly narrow focus. The scope of this analysis is limited to the
separation of the judicial branch, a prime concern in the Australian constitutional
18 See, eg, Redish’s defence of formalism: Redish, above n 6. As Gerangelos notes, ‘to neglect the
purposive element in the separation of powers doctrine in any attempt at defi nition of functions would be
clearly repugnant to the doctrine’s history, development and application in many polities’: Gerangelos,
‘Interpretational Methodology’, above n 3, 8.
19 Rohan Hardcastle, ‘A Chapter III Implication for State Courts: Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions’ 
(1998) 3(1) Newcastle Law Review 13, 27.
20 James Stellios, ‘Reconceiving the Separation of Judicial Power’ (2011) 22 Public Law Review 113;
Mason, above n 3; George Winterton, Parliament, the Executive and the Governor-General (Melbourne
University Press, 1983) 60, 62–3; Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (Federation
Press, 5th ed, 2008) 299, though Gerangelos notes that despite Zines ‘appear[ing] to favour a purposive
functionalist approach ... it would be inaccurate to locate Zines within any precise “school”’: Gerangelos,
‘Interpretational Methodology’, above n 3, 5; Fiona Dowling Wheeler, The Separation of Federal 
Judicial Power: A Purposive Analysis (PhD Thesis, Australian National University, 1999) 156.
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context where the overlap between the legislative and executive branches has
heightened attention to the necessary independence of the federal judicature.
Moreover, the article focuses on the federal sphere. Although jurisprudence
regarding state powers plays a signifi cant role in my analysis, the independence
of federal courts is protected for similar but nonetheless distinct reasons to the
independence of their state counterparts or of judges in their personal capacities.
The arguments developed in this article would require separate and involved 
reconsideration if they were to be extended to state courts or to judges personae
designatae. Lastly, judicial independence and impartiality are protected by a
range of mechanisms, most importantly by the protections afforded to judicial
tenure and remuneration.21 This article considers but one mechanism which
has become the epicentre for Chapter III litigation and for debates around the
interpretation of Chapter III: the limits on the powers that may be permissibly
conferred on the judicature and the allocation of judicial functions.
II  FORMALISM: THE SEPARATION RULES
Long live formalism. It is what makes a government a government 
of laws and not of men.22
— Justice Antonin Scalia
Formalist approaches to the separation of powers contend that functions are
capable of suffi ciently precise defi nition as legislative, executive or judicial to
enable them to be assigned on that basis, and that powers ought to be allocated 
according to their defi nition.23 Compromises or exceptions to the formalist 
allocation of powers based on public policy concerns such as government 
effi ciency are rejected. Thus, formalists propose a system by which a strict 
separation of functions and personnel can be achieved, building ‘high walls’
between the branches of government.24
Formalism is often supported by textualist approaches, drawing attention to
a written constitution’s creation and allocation of power based on defi nition.25
As Professor John F Manning identifi es, ‘formalists also assume that the
Constitution embodies a freestanding separation of powers doctrine’.26 This
aspect of formalism is refl ected in its purposive nature. Formalism is grounded 
21 Constitution s 72.
22 Justice Antonin Scalia, ‘Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws’ in Amy Gutmann (ed), A Matter of Interpretation: 
Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton University Press, 1997) 3, 25.
23 For a concise defi nition of formalism’s key traits, see: Redish, above n 6, 304–5; John F Manning,
‘Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation’ (2011) 124 Harvard Law Review 1939, 1943–4.
24 This phrase comes from Plaut v Spendthrift, 514 US 211, 239 (1995) (Scalia J). For the full quotation,
see below n 29.
25 See, eg, Manning, above n 23, 1943; Boilermakers’ (1956) 94 CLR 254, 288, affd A-G (Cth) v The
Queen (1957) 95 CLR 529, 540 (Privy Council). 
26 Manning, above n 23, 1944 (emphasis in original). 
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in the rationale that only a strict separation of functions can achieve judicial
independence and impartiality.
Formalism’s infl exible nature refl ects its underlying supposition that the greatest 
danger facing the separation of powers is presented by minor threats of incremental
erosion. By restricting the judicature to judicial powers and the political branches
to their own powers, formalists claim to guard against the gradual ‘attrition of the
structural integrity … through minor incursions’ and the ‘erosion of previously
accepted barriers to legislative and executive interference’.27 In this vein,
Justice Scalia has claimed that ‘[t]he rule of law is about form’28 and, in Plaut v
Spendthrift, his Honour said: 
the doctrine of separation of powers is a structural safeguard ... it is a 
prophylactic device, establishing high walls and clear distinctions because 
low walls and vague distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the 
heat of interbranch confl ict.29
In even more illustrative language, formalism claims to avoid a ‘creeping tyranny’
and the ‘death by a thousand cuts’ of the separation of powers.30
Formalism is characterised by caution and presumes that a function may not be
vested in a particular branch of government unless it is demonstrated to have
the necessary defi ning characteristics. The formalist rejection of more fl exible
approaches to determining the allocation of government powers is grounded 
in the view that fl exibility and permissiveness facilitate the feared incremental
erosion of branch independence. As Gerangelos surmises:
If the rigours of this [formalist] approach are ameliorated, even for the 
best of policy reasons, these values will be threatened by the gradual yet 
inexorable erosion of the essential boundaries, even though this may not 
be apparent in a particular case.31
Formalism’s rigid approach to the separation of powers is also argued to enhance
the potential for predictability and consistency, assisting separation principles in
becoming more susceptible to precedent and objective application.32
The primary approach to interpreting Chapter III in Australia is quintessentially
formalist. The maintenance of the independence of the federal judicature stands
upon two rules drawn from Chapter III. The fi rst ‘separation rule’ is that the
27 Brendan Gogarty and Benedict Bartl, ‘Tying Kable Down: The Uncertainty about the Independence and 
Impartiality of State Courts Following Kable v DPP (NSW) and Why it Matters’ (2009) 32 University of 
New South Wales Law Journal 75, 98, 84; Kristen Walker, ‘Persona Designata, Incompatibility and the
Separation of Powers’ (1997) 8 Public Law Review 153, 161; Redish, above n 6, 303.
28 Scalia, above n 22, 25 (emphasis in original).
29 514 US 211, 239 (1995) (Scalia J) (emphasis in original). For a discussion of this case as a classic
instance of formalist reasoning, see Peter A Gerangelos, The Separation of Powers and Legislative
Interference in Judicial Process (Hart Publishing, 2009) 17.
30 Martin H Redish and Elizabeth J Cisar, ‘“If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism
in Separation of Powers Theory’ (1991) 41 Duke Law Journal 449, 453; Gerangelos, ‘Interpretational
Methodology’, above n 3, 3.
31 Gerangelos, ‘Interpretational Methodology’, above n 3, 3.
32 See, eg, Redish, above n 6.
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judicial power of the Commonwealth is vested exclusively in federal courts. This
rule was suggested in some of the High Court’s earliest cases,33 but was fi rst given 
authority in the 1918 decision of Alexander’s Case.34 This rule refl ects a fairly 
straightforward reading of s 71’s conferral of judicial power on courts.35 As James 
Stellios, an advocate of the functionalist method, observes:
the rationale for the … [fi rst separation rule] is readily apparent, and 
no-one has suggested that it should be revisited. Judicial power must be 
exercised by courts with the Ch III protections, otherwise independence 
and impartiality in the exercise of those functions or powers would be 
clearly undermined.36
The second separation rule arises from the 1956 case of Boilermakers’.37 The 
second rule has proved far more problematic than the fi rst.38 The second separation 
rule elevates the nega tive implications of s 71’s conferral of judicial powers on 
federal courts by restricting those courts to the exercise of judicial power and 
incidental or ancillary non-judicial functions.39 The second separation rule has 
been controver sial since its inception,40 but has also been applied in a multitude of 
matters and has given rise to a number of implied doctrines. As Professor Cheryl 
Saunders contends, for these reasons the second separation rule is ‘now fi rmly 
entrenched’.41
The result of the two separation rules is that there may be no mingling of 
judicial and non-judicial powers in the same body, except in strictly limited 
circumstances.42 In this way the separation rules embody the formalist position, 
separating branch functions strictly according to their defi nition as judicial or non-
judicial. Although primarily resting their conclusions on the text and structure 
of the Constitution, the High Court in Boilermakers’ referred to the role of the 
judiciary in maintaining the federal compact as supporting the existence of the 
33 Huddart Parker (1909) 8 CLR 330; R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte 
Brisbane Tramways Co Ltd [No 1] (1914) 18 CLR 54; New South Wales v Commonwealth (1915) 20 
CLR 54.
34 (1918) 25 CLR 434.
35 Alexander’s Case (1918) 25 CLR 434, 442 (Griffi th CJ); Boilermakers’ (1956) 94 CLR 254, 270 
(Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ). Constitution s 71 provides: ‘The judicial power of the 
Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal Supreme Court, to be called the High Court of Australia, 
and in such other federal courts as Parliament creates, and in such other courts as it invests with federal 
jurisdiction. The High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice, and so many other Justices, not less than 
two, as the Parliament prescribes’. 
36 Stellios, ‘Reconceiving the Separation of Judicial Power’, above n 20, 120–1.
37 (1956) 94 CLR 254.
38 See R v Joske; Ex parte Australian Building Construction Employees and Builders’ Labourers’ 
Federation (1974) 130 CLR 87, 90 (Barwick CJ) (‘Joske [No 1]’). More recently, some have
suggested that the second limb of Boilermakers’ be ‘reconceived’ as an incompatibility test: Stellios,
‘Reconceiving the Separation of Judicial Power’, above n 20; Mason, above n 3.
39 Boilermakers’ (1956) 94 CLR 254, 296 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ), affd A-G (Cth) v
The Queen (1957) 95 CLR 529, 540–1 (Privy Council).
40 See discussion below at Part III.
41 Saunders, ‘The Separation of Powers’, above n 14, 13. 
42 Such as in the case of ancillary or incidental functions mentioned above and certain historical functions.
See Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, above n 20, 272–3.
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second separation rule.43 The Privy Council on appeal was more explicit in basing
its support for the second separation rule on purposive considerations, saying:
in a federal system the absolute independence of the judiciary is the bulwark 
of the constitution against encroachment whether by the legislature or by 
the executive. To vest in the same body executive and judicial power is to 
remove a vital constitutional safeguard.44
The perception of the separation rules as providing a ‘vital constitutional
safeguard’ has been reinforced by the High Court in subsequent Chapter III
cases.45
The success of the formalist separation rules in achieving judicial independence
and impartiality hinges on the validity of their underlying assumptions: fi rst,
that branch functions are capable of precise and enforceable defi nition and,
second, that the adoption of a rigid separation of functions is suffi cient to achieve
judicial independence and impartiality. If the fi rst assumption is fl awed then the
separation of branch functions will not be capable of predictable, consistent or 
objective enforcement. In this case the separation rules risk losing legitimacy
and becoming a mere façade for the actual bases on which Chapter III decisions
are reached. The second assumption may also be fl awed. If the separation
rules are divorced from purposive considerations, they risk developing in a
formalistic manner at odds with the values underlying Chapter III, including
judicial independence and impartiality.46 A further criticism often levelled at the
separation rules is that they pose an unnecessary obstacle to proper and effi cient 
government functioning. Considering the development of the separation rules
in Australia reveals the formalist approach has signifi cant — but perhaps not 
insurmountable — limitations.
A  Defi ning Judicial Power
As Sir Anthony Mason observed in the year following his retirement as Chief 
Justice of the High Court:
The lesson of history is that the separation of powers doctrine serves 
a valuable purpose in providing safeguards against the emergence of 
arbitrary or totalitarian power. The lesson of experience is that the 
division of powers is artifi cial and confusing because the three powers of 
government do not lend themselves to defi nition in a way that leads readily 
to a classifi cation of functions.47
43 Wheeler, The Separation of Federal Judicial Power, above n 20, 127–9.
44 A-G (Cth) v The Queen (1957) 95 CLR 529, 540–1.
45 See, eg, R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353, 381 (Kitto J); Quinn (1977) 138 CLR 1, 11 (Jacobs J); Thomas
(2007) 233 CLR 307, 413 (Kirby J); Nicholas (1998) 193 CLR 173, 201 (Kirby J); Wilson (1996) 189
CLR 1, 14 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ).
46 Mason, above n 3, 2.
47 Ibid.
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The potential for the separation rules to provide a strong, even unyielding,
protection for judicial independence and impartiality depends primarily upon
whether functions are capable of being defi ned as judicial or non-judicial with
suffi cient and enforceable precision.48
The ‘classic’ starting point for defi ning the meaning of judicial power in the
Constitution is Griffi th CJ’s defi nition in the 1908 case of Huddart Parker:
[Judicial power means] the power which every sovereign must of necessity 
have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its 
subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. The exercise 
of this power does not begin until some tribunal which has power to give 
a binding and authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is 
called upon to take action.49
As Griffi th CJ’s defi nition suggests, judicial power is indicated essentially by the
conclusive determination of a controversy about existing rights.50 The presence
of these characteristics indicates a function is exclusively judicial. The absence of 
any or all of these characteristics may indicate a power is non-judicial.
At this point judicial power appears to be a reasonably clear concept, identifi able
by a series of characteristics. However, these characteristics are not considered 
to be determinative. Ultimately a determination of whether a function is judicial
or not will take the form of an often unpredictable balancing exercise, weighing
present indicia against absent and contrary indicia and incorporating references
to principled and historical considerations.51 For example, functions that lack 
the characteristics of judicial power — such as the power to issue bankruptcy
sequestration orders — may nonetheless be ‘judicial’ if they are of a kind 
traditionally exercised by courts.52
The High Court has repeatedly acknowledged the diffi culty in defi ning judicial
power with predictability and precision,53 observing that the concept defi es and 
48 Manning, above n 23, 1943.
49 (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357. See also R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd 
(1970) 123 CLR 361, 374–5 (Kitto J) (‘Tasmanian Breweries’).
50 Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, above n 20, 220. 
51 Dominique Dalla-Pozza and George Williams, ‘The Constitutional Validity of Declarations of 
Incompatibility in Australian Charters of Rights’ (2007) 12(1) Deakin Law Review 1, 9–10; Quinn 
(1977) 138 CLR 1, 15 (Aitkin J); R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353, 366–7 (Dixon CJ and McTiernan J); 
Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory (Federation Press, 
5th ed, 2010) 608.
52 R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353, 368 (Dixon CJ and McTiernan J); Zines, The High Court and the
Constitution, above n 20, 256; Stellios, The Federal Judicature, above n 1, 138–41. 
53 See R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353, 366 (Dixon CJ and McTiernan J); Tasmanian Breweries (1970)
123 CLR 361, 373 (Kitto J); Precision Data Holdings Ltd v Willis (1991) 173 CLR 167, 188–9 (Mason
CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ); Brandy v Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245, 257 (Mason CJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ), 267 (Deane,
Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
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‘transcend[s]’ abstract conceptual analysis.54 The ambiguity and unpredictability
in defi ning a function as judicial or non-judicial is enhanced by regularly invoked 
categories of exceptions, attributable to what Professor Geoffrey Sawer poetically
described as courts’ ‘general power of ignoring defi nitions’.55 The regular use of 
the qualifi er ‘quasi’ and distinctions between ‘core’ and ‘primary’ functions, and 
‘incidental’ and ‘secondary’ functions, demonstrate the substantial grey areas
between judicial and non-judicial powers.56 Some functions are even capable
of being vested in multiple branches of government. These classes of functions
include ‘innominate’ powers, dependent on Parliament for their ultimate
characterisation, and ‘chameleon’ powers, which take their character from the
body in which they are vested.57 Indeed, in argument before the High Court in
2007, then Commonwealth Solicitor General David Bennett QC argued that the
recognition of chameleon powers had ‘removed much of [the second separation
rule’s] rigidity so that it does not matter much anymore’.58
As Professor H L A Hart famously observed, concepts have ‘a core of settled 
meaning, but there will be, as well, a penumbra of debatable cases’.59 Hart’s
acknowledgment of diffi cult ‘penumbral’ cases applies aptly in the Chapter III
context.60 Formalism’s fi rst underlying assumption — that powers are capable
of precise defi nition — is valid with respect to the core of judicial power. For 
example, the conduct and determination of a criminal trial and the authoritative
adjudication of disputes arising under tort or contract law are of a clearly
judicial nature. The assumption is also valid with respect to the exteriority of 
non-judicial functions, such as the undertaking of criminal investigations or 
policy development. Formalism’s basic assumption runs into diffi culty when the
function lies in the considerable penumbra of uncertainty, for example the issuing
of control orders (involving the creation of rights and obligations according to
predictive criteria)61 or in the adjudication of disputes arising from industrial
54 See Tasmanian Breweries (1970) 123 CLR 361, 394 (Windeyer J); Nicholas (1998) 193 CLR 173,
207 (Gaudron J), 219 (McHugh J); Precision Data Holdings Ltd v Willis (1991) 173 CLR 167, 188
(Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ); Gerangelos, ‘Interpretational
Methodology’, above n 3; Denise Meyerson, ‘The Independence of the Judiciary in Australia and South
Africa: Comparative Lessons’ in Penelope E Andrews and Susan Bazilli (eds), Law and Rights: Global 
Perspectives on Constitutionalism and Governance (Vandeplas Publishing, 2008) 79.
55 Geoffrey Sawer, ‘Judicial Power under the Constitution’ in Justice Else-Mitchell (ed), Essays on the
Australian Constitution (Law Book, 1961) 71, 76.
56 Gerangelos, ‘Interpretational Methodology’, above n 3, 1.
57 For a valuable discussion of these two classes of functions, see Suri Ratnapala, Australian Constitutional 
Law: Foundations and Theory (Oxford University Press, 2007) 136–43.
58 Thomas (2007) 233 CLR 307, 316. This was an argument given short shrift by the dissenting members
of the Court: at 426 (Kirby J), 467 (Hayne J).
59 H L A Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 593,
607.
60 Ratnapala, above n 57, 124.
61 See Thomas (2007) 233 CLR 307, and the subsequent critique of the majority’s decision to uphold 
the issuance of control orders as a valid exercise the judicial power in, eg, Andrew Lynch, ‘Thomas v 
Mowbray: Australia’s “War on Terror” Reaches the High Court’ (2008) 32 Melbourne University Law
Review 1182; Denise Meyerson, ‘Using Judges to Manage Risk: The Case of Thomas v Mowbray’ 
(2008) 36 Federal Law Review 209.
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awards (which may involve broad, highly discretionary standards).62 In these
penumbral cases the characteristics that distinguish judicial from non-judicial
functions are simply inadequate to produce a clear result, and risk being stretched 
and contorted to resolve the constitutional question at hand. These kinds of cases
make clear that something more, beyond the accepted list of characteristics, is
needed to determine whether the function may be conferred on the judiciary in
keeping with Chapter III. Two factors to which the court has looked to provide
this additional determinative criterion are the historical functions of courts and 
the will of Parliament. 
The fact that a function has been traditionally exercised by courts will generally
indicate it is judicial and that its vesture in courts is in keeping with broader 
notions of judicial independence and impartiality.63 This is clear enough when
the function has been exercised by the judicature for an extended period, such as
in the abovementioned example of bankruptcy sequestration notices.64 However,
when the function is novel the court may rely on reasoning by analogy to establish
the power is ‘of a kind’ traditionally exercised by courts.65 Reasoning by analogy
is a familiar and valuable judicial approach, but the method is far from ideal in
determining Chapter III cases. As Sawer observed, to defi ne judicial power as the
power exercised by courts and take its meaning from ‘what courts do and the way
in which they do it’ is circular and ultimately unconvincing.66
Reasoning by analogy also risks becoming a ‘cherry-picking’ exercise if imprecise
or inappropriate analogues may be relied upon to determine a power’s defi nition.
For example, analogues may be drawn from different jurisdictional contexts such
as the United Kingdom or the Australian states, each subject to much more fl exible
separation of powers rules permitting courts to exercise non-judicial functions.
References to the powers of courts in those jurisdictions would not necessarily
demonstrate the judicial nature of a function. Functions vested in federal courts
on the basis that they are ancillary or incidental to an exercise of judicial power 
also risk being harnessed as judicial power analogues simply because they are
exercised by courts, notwithstanding their non-judicial and exceptional nature.67
Reliance on loose analogy in this context opens the way to a broadening of the
strict separation and enables the kind of incremental erosion that formalism is
designed to prevent. Ultimately it serves to highlight the challenging position a
decision-maker is placed in when determining a Chapter III case according to the
62 See R v Spicer; Ex parte Australian Builders’ Labourers’ Federation (1957) 100 CLR 277; R v
Commonwealth Industrial Court; Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union, Australian Section (1960)
103 CLR 368.
63 Though care must be taken in drawing such conclusions: P H Lane, Lane’s Commentary on the
Australian Constitution (Law Book, 2nd ed, 1997) 467; Quinn (1977) 138 CLR 1, 11 (Jacobs J).
64 R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353.
65 Ibid 368 (Dixon CJ and McTiernan J); Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, above n 20, 256.
66 G Sawer, ‘The Separation of Powers in Australian Federalism’ (1961) 35 Australian Law Journal 177, 
179–80. See also Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245, 
267 (Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
67 See Kirby J’s dissenting critique of Gleeson CJ’s majority decision in Thomas (2007) 233 CLR 307, 
422–3, 425.
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separation rules, and the inadequacy of the characteristics of judicial power in
defi ning a function with enforceable precision. 
The court has also relied upon legislative intention to fulfi l the task of defi ning a
power as judicial or non-judicial.68 Parliamentary intent has an important place in
any exercise of statutory interpretation.69 In deciding whether a power is judicial
or otherwise, the intention behind the relevant Act ought to play some part.
However, reliance on legislative intent to determine the defi nition of a power risks
the independence and impartiality of the judiciary by introducing an avenue for 
judicial deference into the analysis. Deference is appropriate in many scenarios,
but it must be constrained.70 Excessive deference signals that a court may not be
appropriately performing its role as an independent check on government power;
minimal deference indicates that a court may be exercising functions belonging
to the representative, political arms of government.71
In Chapter III cases deference is particularly worrying. Utilising parliamentary
intent to defi ne governmental powers risks enabling parliament to determine
the outer limits of judicial power and, in turn, the limits on legislative power 
too. Moreover, functions that do not conform to the characteristics of judicial
power may compromise rights or process protections or achieve particularly
controversial government policies.72 In these contexts there is a particular need 
for robust judicial review.73 The purposes of the separation of judicial power 
drive at the necessity for the individualistic, rights-focused ‘morality’ of law to
counterbalance the majoritarian nature of politics, and emphasise the need for 
robust judicial oversight to provide an avenue for individual rights and liberties
to be upheld.74 Thus, harnessing parliamentary intent as the determinative factor 
in Chapter III cases presents a real risk of handing ultimate responsibility for 
the boundaries of the penumbra of judicial power to Parliament, rather than
maintaining the strong sense of judicial oversight required to prevent the erosion of 
constitutional limits. Parliamentary intent ought to play some role in determining
Chapter III questions, but judicial independence and impartiality is placed at risk 
if it provides the determinative criterion in penumbral cases.
The basic formalist assumption that judicial power is capable of judicially
enforceable defi nition is subject to serious limitations.75 Judicial power is capable
68 See discussion in Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, above n 20, 258–61.
69 See, eg, Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, 381 (McHugh,
Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).
70 Jonathan Sumption, ‘Judicial and Political Decision-Making: The Uncertain Boundary’ (Speech
delivered at the F A Mann Lecture, Lincoln’s Inn, 9 November 2011) 19–20.
71 See Redish’s attack on the ‘total deferential’ model of interpreting the separation of powers: Redish,
above n 6, 307. 
72 See, eg, Australia’s anti-terror control orders and preventative detention orders in, respectively, the
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) divs 104–5, critiqued in Andrew Lynch and Alexander Reilly, ‘The
Constitutional Validity of Terrorism Orders of Control and Preventative Detention’ (2007) 10 Flinders
Journal of Law Reform 105. See also the Chapter III challenge to aspects of the fair criminal trial in
Nicholas (1998) 193 CLR 173, discussed in Lacey, above n 11, 72–7.
73 Laws, above n 6, 576.
74 Ibid; Redish, above n 6, 307.
75 See Mason, above n 3, 5–6.
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of defi nition but in many cases concentrating on defi nitional characteristics alone
is not suffi cient to provide the rigidity, predictability, consistency or certainty
that formalism claims as its strengths. The separation rules fail to indicate which
characteristics outweigh others, how heavily historical analogy and legislative
intent play into the equation, or the extent to which the purposes of the separation
rules may become determinative. The overall lack of clarity in the defi nition
of judicial power has caused the separation rules to become unpredictable.
Unpredictability gives judicial power the appearance of being a malleable
concept, susceptible to wildly different interpretations. This in turn affects the
perception of the judiciary as administering objective legal standards. In this
vein, Sawer’s 1961 observation that ‘the law is full of bad logic serving to cloak 
the exercise of a judicial discretion’ continues to refl ect a reasonable impression
of the interpretation of Chapter III.76
The proper method of resolving cases in which the characteristics of judicial
power are insuffi cient to produce a clear result is itself unresolved. If a means
of determining those cases in a manner that does not risk actual or perceived 
judicial independence or impartiality was adopted, the limits of formalism’s
basic assumption could be addressed and the separation rules could fi nd renewed 
legitimacy.
B  Is Formalism too Formalistic?
A second criticism made of formalism is that the narrow focus of the separation
rules on defi nitional characteristics produces technical decisions that do nothing
to achieve the purposes of Chapter III. As Sir Anthony Mason warns, ‘if taken
too far, the identifi cation of those characteristics [of judicial power] may inhibit 
the development of judicial process’.77
The formalist approach is built upon the view that the allocation of functions
based on defi nition will naturally produce outcomes that maintain judicial
independence and impartiality, in the longer term if not in the immediate case.
The rules outline the entire role of a court in deciding a Chapter III challenge as
being to defi ne the function at hand; they do not suggest a need to engage with
purposive arguments. As a result, robust engagement with considerations outside
the list of defi nitional criteria becomes diffi cult or appears tangential for a court 
applying the separation rules.
Fair judicial process is closely connected to the independence and impartiality of 
federal courts.78 Gaudron J provided the following description of fair process in
Re Nolan; Ex parte Young:
76 Sawer, ‘Judicial Power under the Constitution’, above n 55, 75.
77 Mason, above n 3, 2. 
78 Sir Gerard Brennan, ‘Lessons from a Life in the Law’ (Speech delivered at the Annual Hal Wootten
Lecture, University of New South Wales, 23 August 2012) 16–18.
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open and public enquiry (subject to limited exceptions), the application of 
the rules of natural justice, the ascertainment of the facts as they are and 
as they bear on the right or liability in issue and the identifi cation of the 
applicable law, followed by an application of that law to those facts.79
These features go to the equality and objectivity of judicial proceedings and thus
form integral aspects of the independence and impartiality of courts.80 Thus, one
measure of whether the formal separation rules achieve judicial independence
and impartiality is the extent to which they are capable of protecting fair process
from legislative incursion. 
The High Court has acknowledged that Chapter III requires the exercise of 
functions in a manner not repugnant to judicial independence and impartiality.81
That said, fair process fi ts awkwardly within the formalist framework created by
the separation rules.82 Some justices have envisaged process protections within
the second separation rule even though fair process is not mentioned in the classic
characteristics of judicial power.83 Gaudron J suggests that ‘[a]n essential feature
of judicial power is that it be exercised in accordance with the judicial process’.84
Other justices, such as Deane J, place due process protections within the fi rst 
separation rule by including them within the essential features of a court.85 These
two conceptions may exist alongside one another — fair process may inform the
essential characteristics of both judicial power and of courts.86
There are weaknesses in both Gaudron and Deane JJ’s approaches to protecting
fair process within the separation rules framework.87 Both have received varied 
authoritative support, and have therefore failed to produce a consistent set of 
principles but rather determine in an ad hoc manner whether one feature or 
another is a defi ning characteristic.88 By focusing on singular defi ning or essential
features, both approaches conceive of process protections in a minimalist 
fashion. In order to qualify for constitutional protection the feature must qualify
as a defi ning feature of judicial power or of what it is to be a court. This sets a
high bar. The giving of reasons, for example, may be an essential feature of a
79 (1991) 172 CLR 460, 496 (Gaudron J) (‘Nolan’), quoted in Fardon v A-G (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575,
615 (Gummow J) (‘Fardon’).
80 See Wheeler, ‘Due Process’ above n 15, 211; Kable (1996) 189 CLR 51, 106–7 (Gaudron J); Nolan
(1991) 172 CLR 460, 496–7 (Gaudron J); Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 487–8 (Deane
and Toohey JJ); Polyukovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501, 703–4 (Gaudron J) (‘Polyukovich’);
Steytler and Field, above n 11, 255–9.
81 See above n 80. See also Will Bateman, ‘Procedural Due Process under the Australian Constitution’ 
(2009) 31 Sydney Law Review 411.
82 Bateman, above n 81, 432.
83 Wheeler, ‘Due Process’, above n 15, 209–10.
84 Polyukovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 703. For a critique of this approach, see Wheeler, ‘Due Process’, 
above n 15, 210–11; Bateman, above n 81, 432.
85 Bateman, above n 81, 433–41; Wheeler, ‘Due Process’, above n 15, 209.
86 Wheeler, ‘Due Process’, above n 15, 211. Though this may have consequences in the context of state
courts, capable of exercising non-judicial powers but requiring the defi ning characteristics of courts. See
discussion of the principles concerning state courts below in Part III.
87 For a critique of the approach conceiving of due process as within the second separation rule, see
Bateman, above n 81, 433–41; Wheeler, ‘Due Process’, above n 15, 209. 
88 Bateman, above n 81.
Monash University Law Review (Vol 39, No 1)80
court.89 Reliance on secret evidence and ex parte hearings, each of which severely
impacts the equality and openness of proceedings by withholding important 
material from a party, have an accepted place in some judicial proceedings. Thus
these mechanisms may not be defi ning features, even where they are used in
unusual contexts and result in severe impositions on the rights and liberties of a
citizen.90 The ‘essential features’ approach to protecting fair process lends itself 
to allowing cumulative compromises to the fairness and equality of proceedings,
when each individual compromise fails to qualify as a defi ning feature of judicial
power or a court.91 Hence, the risk of incremental damage to the integrity of 
judicial proceedings feared by formalists is enhanced by the indirect way in
which the separation rules protect fair process. 
This weakness in the capacity of the separation rules to achieve judicial
independence and impartiality is serious, but perhaps not insurmountable. If the
formalist separation rules were to accommodate a direct avenue whereby the
manner in which a function is exercised could be taken into account, process
protections would no longer need to be conceptualised through the prism of the
essential defi ning features of judicial power or of courts. 
C  The Enemy of Innovation
In 1974, Barwick CJ famously criticised the second separation rule as leading to 
‘excessive subtlety and technicality in the operation of the Constitution without, in
my opinion, any compensating benefi t’.92 The Chief Justice’s views on the second 
separation rule have been reiterated by others, often coupled with the general
rebuke that the rules unnecessarily impede the development of administrative,
industrial and other areas of law.93
The effi ciency and effectiveness of a number of areas of law and government 
action would undoubtedly benefi t from the mixing of judicial and non-judicial
functions in institutions. This is increasingly the case as government broadens
the scope of administrative powers, develops the so-called ‘integrity branch’
responsible for oversight of executive action, and further desires to utilise judicial
expertise in non-judicial contexts.94 Similar arguments have arisen in the human
89 Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181, 192 [7] (French CJ and Kiefel J), 229–30 [109] (Gummow, Hayne,
Crennan and Bell JJ).
90 See Thomas (2007) 233 CLR 307; Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Inc v Commissioner of Police (2008)
234 CLR 532 (‘Gypsy Jokers’); K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501 
(‘K-Generation’).
91 See Meyerson’s critique of the High Court’s decision in Thomas on this basis, amongst others, in
Meyerson, ‘Using Judges to Manage Risk’, above n 61, 224–5.
92 Joske [No 1] (1974) 130 CLR 87, 90. Stephen and Mason JJ agreed with Barwick CJ. Mason J said 
that ‘a serious question arises as to the course which this Court should adopt in relation to the principle
conclusion reached in [Boilermakers’]’: at 102.
93 Stellios, ‘Reconceiving the Separation of Judicial Power’, above n 20, 124; Mason, above n 3, 5.
94 Mason, above n 3, 6; Chief Justice James Spigelman, ‘The Integrity Branch of Government’ (2004)
78 Australian Law Journal 724. See also, on the development of government beyond the traditional
tripartite conception of government power, Eoin Carolan, The New Separation of Powers: A Theory for 
the Modern State (Oxford University Press, 2009).
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rights context.95 The essential thrust of these arguments is that the formalist 
separation of judicial powers has impeded the development of mechanisms by
which executive and legislative power may be overseen and subject to challenge.
The separation of functions along strict formalist lines indisputably impedes
government effi ciency and innovation. But, if one accepts the prophylactic
justifi cation for the strictness of the formalist approach, these innovations must 
be seen for their ability to ultimately undermine institutional independence and 
impartiality, even if their immediate consequence is to provide an additional
check on the political branches. 
Administrative and industrial tribunals determine policy issues; they are
intrinsically bound up in the interpretation of the political aspects of government 
action. Tribunal decision-makers even ‘stand in the shoes’ of government agents.
To couple judicial power with such tribunals would be tantamount to doing away
with the separation of powers entirely. This is particularly the case in Australia
where the legislature and executive are already so entwined. The conferral of 
judicial power on executive bodies may present a vast improvement in effi ciency,
but in certain contexts it would permit a single entity to interpret policy, exercise
executive discretion and make binding orders for remedies with respect to political
and rights-based subject matters. The perceived impartiality and integrity of 
judicial decision-making would be challenged to its core by such an allowance. 
In Momcilovic v The Queen,96 the High Court unanimously determined (in obiter 
dicta) that the power to issue declarations of incompatibility under the Charter 
of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) is non-judicial on the basis
that it had no impact on the resolution of the justiciable controversy between the
parties to the dispute.97 This decision effectively rules out the option of human
rights protection at the national level based on the dialogue model adopted in the
United Kingdom, New Zealand, the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria.
Counter arguments exist to the Court’s conclusion that the power is non-judicial.98
It may appear absurd that the power to declare legislation to be incompatible
with express human rights protections under the dialogue model could violate
95 Dalla-Pozza and Williams, above n 51. Cf Michael McHugh, ‘A Human Rights Act, the Courts and 
the Constitution’ (2009) 11 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 86; Jim South, ‘The Campaign for a 
National Bill of Rights: Would “Declarations of Incompatibility” be Compatible with the Constitution?’
(2007) 10 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 2.
96 (2011) 245 CLR 1 (‘Momcilovic’).
97 Ibid 60–1 [80]–[81], 65 [89] (French CJ), 94 [178] (Gummow J), 123 [280] (Hayne J), 185 [457]
(Heydon J), 222 [584] (Crennan and Kiefel JJ), 241 [661] (Bell J). Only Crennan and Kiefel JJ held 
the power to be incidental to the judicial task of determining the primary controversy concerning legal
rights: at 227 [600].
98 See, eg, Dalla-Pozza and Williams, above n 51, 9–27, who argue that the dialogue model of human
rights protection complies with relatively expansive interpretations of each characteristic of judicial
power. For instance, the authors adopt Lacey and Wright’s ‘more expansive understanding’ of 
enforcability as requiring the power to be ‘conclusive of the controversy regarding consistency’: at 
17. See further Wendy Lacey and David Wright, ‘Highlighting Inconsistency: The Declaration as a
Remedy in Administrative Law and International Human Rights Standards’ in Chris Finn (ed), Shaping 
Administrative Law for the Next Generation: Fresh Perspectives (Australian Institute of Administrative
Law, 2005) 32, 55.
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the proper place of courts and present a threat to Australian constitutionalism.
That said, declarations of incompatibility compromise key features of judicial
power and are not of a kind traditionally exercised by courts. A fi nding that 
declarations are in keeping with Chapter III would risk setting a precedent that 
the powers of courts do not necessarily need to be binding, authoritative, or result 
in any right or remedy, gutting the core of judicial power and enabling legislative
compromises to these integral features of judicial decisions. In this vein, former 
Justice of the High Court Michael McHugh argued, prior to Momcilovic, that the
dialogue model of human rights protection is not in keeping with the Constitution,
is ‘suboptimal’ and should be rejected.99 In essence, McHugh argues that bringing
the model into line with accepted notions of judicial power by empowering the
court to issue a binding and enforceable remedial order following a fi nding
of incompatibility would help align the power with the core characteristics of 
judicial power and present an improvement in human rights protection.100 This is
a compelling argument. 
It is notable that the High Court’s analysis of declarations of incompatibility
under the incompatibility test was by no means exemplary of clear, concise or 
accessible decision-making. The ratio of the decision is disparate between the
judgments and it is ultimately unclear whether the power is incompatible or not.
Others have engaged expertly with the complicated issues around human rights
instruments in Australia and their impact on constitutional values, and I do not 
explore these questions further in the present article.101
The formalist separation rules acknowledge the slippery slope that follows if 
courts are permitted to re-make government decisions, interpret policy or exercise
functions lacking fundamental characteristics of judicial power. Effi ciency is
no excuse for undermining judicial independence or impartiality, as the ends
achieved by the separation of judicial power are fundamental to the maintenance
of core aspects of Australian constitutionalism. It is entirely justifi ed, even crucial,
that judicial independence and impartiality present a considerable obstacle to
government innovation and effi ciency. 
D  Does the Formalist Approach Achieve Judicial 
Independence and Impartiality?
There is no straightforward answer to the question: ‘do the formalist separation
rules achieve judicial independence and impartiality?’ The strict approach has
much to commend it as a means of achieving the purposes of Chapter III. The
separation rules would be greatly assisted by a candid acknowledgment that not 
all functions are susceptible to precise defi nition and in those cases some other 
99 McHugh, above n 95, 95.
100 See McHugh’s proposed ‘preferred model’: ibid 96.
101 See, eg, Dalla-Pozza and Williams, above n 51; McHugh, above n 95, 97; James Stellios, ‘Federal
Dimensions to the ACT Human Rights Act’ (2005) 47 AIAL Forum 33; Geoffrey Lindell, ‘The Statutory
Protection of Rights and Parliamentary Sovereignty: Guidance from the United Kingdom?’ (2006) 17
Public Law Review 188, 204–7. 
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standard or factor is required to determine the allocation of power. Admittedly
this concession goes against the formalist grain. Of course this additional
factor would need to accord with the maintenance of judicial independence and 
impartiality, which I submit historical analogies and parliamentary intent fail to
do. Likewise, if a clear avenue for the development of fair process jurisprudence
were opened within the strictures of the separation rules, the rules may evolve in
a manner more clearly and accountably engaged with the purposes of Chapter III.
The argument remains that rather than seeking to iron-out the weaknesses in
the capacity of the separation rules to achieve independence and impartiality,
the approach ought simply be rejected and replaced with a wholly substantive
test; one not plagued by the problems of defi nitional imprecision and formalistic
technicality discussed. 
III  FUNCTIONALISM: THE INCOMPATIBILITY TEST
[W]hat possible reason can there be for invalidating conferral of a
particular non-judicial function on a judge when the function is not 
a threat to these values? Would this not involve what Peter Strauss
calls ‘technical positivism’ — elevating form above substance, or 
making a fetish of a rule for the sake of doctrinal purity?102
— Professor Denise Meyerson
Functionalists advocate a more dynamic approach to the separation of powers
than formalists, contending that considerations beyond mere defi nition ought 
to determine the allocation of government powers. Functionalism is susceptible
to many variations. In Australia the prevailing functionalist approach is
characterised by an incompatibility test, by which the branches of government 
may exercise any powers except those demonstrably incompatible with the
maintenance of institutional independence and integrity. In the Chapter III
context the incompatibility test elevates the core purpose of the separation of 
judicial power — judicial independence and impartiality — to a determinative
level. This focuses attention on the nature of the powers themselves and the
manner of their exercise, and avoids the technical and arguably distracting focus
on defi nitional characteristics which has proved so problematic for the separation
rules.103 Advocates of the incompatibility test claim this direct engagement with
the concepts of judicial independence and impartiality offers the ideal mechanism
for their achievement, and that this test is ‘fl exible enough, at least in theory, to
suggest a wide range of limitations on … legislative power’.104
102 Meyerson, ‘The Independence of the Judiciary in Australia and South Africa’, above n 54, 82, quoting
Peter L Strauss, ‘Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions — A Foolish
Inconsistency?’ (1987) 72 Cornell Law Review 488, 512.
103 Fiona Wheeler, ‘The Rise and Rise of Judicial Power under Chapter III of the Constitution: A Decade in
Overview’ (2000) 20 Australian Bar Review 282, 287; Mason, above n 3, 2, 5.
104 Fiona Wheeler, ‘The Kable Doctrine and State Legislative Power over State Courts’ (2005) 20(2)
Australasian Parliamentary Review 15, 22. See also Mason, above n 3, 2.
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Functionalist criticisms of the formalist separation rules are substantially limited 
to the second rule, limiting the permissible powers of courts. The fi rst separation
rule restricting judicial powers to the judiciary has been applied uncontentiously on
‘numerous occasions and never questioned’.105 The adoption of an incompatibility
test to replace the second separation rule is by no means a new proposition. Prior 
to Boilermakers’ there had been some indication that a functionalist approach
would determine the permissible functions of federal courts. A functionalist 
style inconsistency test was suggested in the opinions of four justices in the 1938
case of R v Federal Court of Bankruptcy; Ex parte Lowenstein.106 Changes to the
composition of the High Court meant that when Boilermakers’ came before it in
1956 the second separation rule had gained majority support.107
Despite the authoritative adoption of the second separation rule and the
unanimous validation of the decision by the Privy Council on appeal, the High
Court and academic community remained divided as to whether an alternative
test ought to govern the permissible functions of federal courts. The popular 
alternative proposition was the incompatibility (or inconsistency) test suggested in
Lowenstein108 and advocated cogently by Williams J in dissent in Boilermakers’.109
The test found favour with the High Court in the 1990s when questions arose
concerning Chapter III limits on the permissible functions of state courts and of 
federal judges acting personae designatae. It was in respect of this period of the
‘Mason Court’ that Professor Leslie Zines says: ‘In constitutional law an assault 
was made on what was seen as one aspect of legalism, namely formalism’.110
The persona designata doctrine is an important and long-standing exception to 
the second separation rule. This doctrine asserts that Chapter III does not bind 
federal judges in their personal capacity and so non-judicial functions may be
conferred on judges individually. Despite the artifi cial fl avour of the doctrine,111
it has been extensively used and upheld as in keeping with the Constitution.112
In order to prevent the exception from overwhelming the rule, an exception to
the exception was proposed. In 1995, the High Court in Grollo gave authority to
the existence of an incompatibility limit on the non-judicial functions capable of 
105 Stellios, ‘Reconceiving the Separation of Judicial Power’, above n 20, 114.
106 (1938) 59 CLR 556 (‘Lowenstein’); Stellios, ‘Reconceiving the Separation of Judicial Power’, above
n 20, 115; Wheeler, ‘The Boilermakers Case’, above n 12, 163. Dixon and Evatt JJ dissented in
Lowenstein, Dixon J already having revealed his formalist leaning in Victorian Stevedoring and General 
Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dignan (1931) 46 CLR 73, as well as later in extrajudicial speeches, such as
Sir Owen Dixon, ‘The Separation of Powers in the Australian Constitution’ (Speech delivered at the
Lawyers’ Club, New York City, 3 December 1942) 1, 5.
107 Wheeler, ‘The Boilermakers Case’, above n 12, 163–4.
108 Stellios, ‘Reconceiving the Separation of Judicial Power’, above n 20, 115.
109 (1956) 94 CLR 254, 313–15.
110 Leslie Zines, ‘2002 Sir Maurice Byers Lecture: Legalism, Realism and Judicial Rhetoric in Constitutional
Law’ [2002–2003] (Summer) Bar News 13, 15.
111 Hilton v Wells (1985) 157 CLR 57, 84 (‘Hilton’); Medical Board (Vic) v Meyer (1937) 58 CLR 62, 97;
Grollo (1995) 184 CLR 348, 377 (McHugh J); Wilson (1996) 189 CLR 1, 12–13 (Brennan CJ, Dawson,
Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ); Mason, above n 3, 5.
112 Hilton (1985) 157 CLR 57; Wilson (1996) 189 CLR 1, 43 (Kirby J); Grollo (1995) 184 CLR 348, 376
(McHugh J). For a history of this practice and its controversy, see A J Brown, ‘The Wig or the Sword?
Separation of Powers and the Plight of the Australian Judge’ (1992) 21 Federal Law Review 48.
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being vested in judges personae designatae.113 The incompatibility limit prohibits
non-judicial powers from being conferred on a judge persona designata if the
power is incompatible with the independence or integrity of the judge or the
judicial institution. 
Grollo concerned a challenge to provisions enabling telecommunication 
interception warrants to be issued by judges personae designatae. Despite the
intrusive nature of the warrants, the secretive in camera nature of the proceedings
in which they are issued and the fact this administrative power is exercised in
furtherance of a police investigation, a majority of the High Court upheld the
provisions as compatible with judicial independence and integrity.114 The
incompatibility limit was applied to invalidate a conferral of power on a federal
judge for the fi rst (and to date only) time the following year in Wilson.115 In
Wilson, the appointment of Justice Jane Mathews as ‘reporter’ to the Minister on 
whether certain areas should be classifi ed as Aboriginal heritage sites was held to
be invalid on the basis that the appointment gave ‘the appearance that the judge is
acting, not in any independent way, but as a servant or agent of the Minister’ and 
thus diminished confi dence in the judicial institution as a whole.116
Six days following Wilson, the High Court introduced a second fi eld of application
for the incompatibility test. In Kable, the High Court invalidated state legislation
providing for the New South Wales Supreme Court to order the preventive
incarceration of a named individual at the completion of his sentence for serious
offences.117 The decision was grounded in the ad hominem nature of the Act and 
in the various ways in which the Supreme Court proceedings departed from fair 
process.118 Kable ought to be considered in light of the High Court’s later decision
in Fardon.119 In Fardon, the Court upheld the capacity of the Queensland Supreme 
Court to issue preventive detention orders almost identical to those considered in
Kable. Compatibility in Fardon rested primarily on the general application of the 
Act in contrast to the incompatible ad hominem Kable Act.
The revolutionary aspect of Kable is that it determined Chapter III limits on the
permissible functions of state courts. State courts are outside the direct ambit of 
the federal separation of powers. Prior to Kable it had been generally accepted 
that there were few restrictions on the Parliaments’ powers with respect to state
courts.120 A majority of the High Court in Kable found that to the extent state
113 (1995) 184 CLR 348, 376 (McHugh J), 365 (Brennan CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ); Wilson
(1996) 189 CLR 1, 43 (Kirby J); Hussain v Minister for Foreign Affairs (2008) 169 FCR 241, 261
(‘Hussain’).
114 Grollo (1995) 184 CLR 348, 365 (Brennan CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ).
115 (1996) 189 CLR 1.
116 Ibid 26 (Gaudron J).
117 Kable (1996) 189 CLR 51.
118 Ibid 98 (Toohey J), 106–8 (Gaudron J), 122–3 (McHugh J), 131–2 (Gummow J); Fardon (2004) 223
CLR 575, 655 (Callinan and Heydon JJ).
119 (2004) 223 CLR 575.
120 See, eg, S (a Child) v The Queen (1995) 12 WAR 392; Building Construction Employees and Builders’ 
Labourers Federation of New South Wales v Minister for Industrial Relations (1986) 7 NSWLR 372; 
City of Collingwood v Victoria [No 2] [1994] 1 VR 652; Mabo v Queensland (1988) 166 CLR 186, 202
(Wilson J); Steytler and Field, above n 11, 230; Hardcastle, above n 19, 13.
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courts are vested with limited federal jurisdiction and form part of an integrated 
national court system their independence and integrity are entitled to constitutional
protection under Chapter III.121 Accordingly, state courts may not be vested with
functions that are incompatible with the independence or integrity of the judicial
institution. Subsequent case law has clarifi ed that the Kable incompatibility
test is aligned with that introduced in Grollo, as the rulings ‘share a common
foundation in constitutional principle’ which ‘has as its touchstone protection
against legislative or executive intrusion upon the institutional integrity of the
courts, whether federal or State’.122
The functionalist incompatibility test has thus been subject to substantial
jurisprudential development in Australia, despite the predominance of the formalist 
separation rules in determining Chapter III challenges with respect to federal
courts. At fi rst blush it may seem incontrovertible that elevating the purposes of 
the separation of judicial powers to a determinative level presents the ideal means
of achieving those purposes. Critics of the incompatibility test suggest it fails to
provide a workable or predictable standard and its underlying permissiveness and 
fl exibility have facilitated the test’s development into a grievously insubstantial
limit on legislative power.123 By considering how the notion of incompatibility
has been developed in the Grollo and Kable lines of cases, one may assess the
strength of these criticisms and the success of the functionalist incompatibility
test in achieving judicial independence and impartiality.
A  Defi ning Incompatibility
Just as the defi nition of judicial power lies at the heart of the separation rules,
the meaning of incompatibility is central to the success of the functionalist 
incompatibility test. In upholding the High Court’s decision in Boilermakers’,
the Privy Council described the incompatibility standard as ‘vague and 
unsatisfactory’.124 The development of the incompatibility test since Grollo
suggests incompatibility may be inapt for exhaustive defi nition and hold 
deliberately to its characteristic fl exibility, but is as precise and enforceable a
standard as judicial power.125
121 Kable (1996) 189 CLR 51, 82 (Dawson J), 103 (Toohey J). See also Fardon (2004) 223 CLR 575, 591 
(Gleeson CJ), 655 (Callinan and Heydon JJ); K-Generation (2009) 237 CLR 501, 529 [88] (French CJ);
Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531, 579–81 [95]–[100] (French CJ,
Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
122 Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181, 228 (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ); Rebecca Welsh,
‘“Incompatibility” Rising? Some Potential Consequences of Wainohu v New South Wales’ (2011) 22
Public Law Review 259. See also the application of the Wilson test in Momcilovic (2011) 245 CLR 1, 
95–6 [183]–[184] (Gummow J).
123 Redish, above n 6, 306; Walker, above n 27, 161.
124 A-G (Cth) v The Queen (1957) 95 CLR 529, 542. See also Dan Meagher, ‘The Status of the Kable
Principle in Australian Constitutional Law’ (2005) 16 Public Law Review 182; Gogarty and Bartl, above
n 27.
125 Stellios, ‘Reconceiving the Separation of Judicial Power’, above n 20.
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In Grollo the majority justices described three ways in which incompatibility
may arise. First, the actual performance of the judge’s judicial functions may
be signifi cantly compromised as a result of a non-judicial function.126 Second, 
the personal integrity of the judge may be compromised or impaired by the non-
judicial function.127 Neither of the fi rst two bases of incompatibility identifi ed in
Grollo have been applied in the cases to date. On the basis of his actions persona
designata the trial judge was required to excuse himself from the trial of Bruno
Grollo without giving reasons to the parties. Whilst this scenario presents clear 
arguments for personal integrity incompatibility, a majority of the High Court 
upheld the provisions on the basis that the confl ict could hypothetically have been
avoided by ‘the adoption of an appropriate practice’.128 In consequence, the fi rst 
two grounds of incompatibility will only arise in rare cases where confl ict is
incapable of being avoided.
The third form of incompatibility described in Grollo is ‘public confi dence
incompatibility’. Public confi dence incompatibility arises where the conferral
of the non-judicial function diminishes public confi dence in the independence
and integrity of the judicial institution as a whole.129 Despite varying judicial
acceptance of public confi dence as an enforceable consideration,130 it is this form
of incompatibility that has supported the fi ndings of incompatibility discussed 
above and has come to characterise incompatibility jurisprudence. The Court 
in Wilson suggested a three-stage process focusing on independence to assist a 
determination of public confi dence incompatibility.
First, incompatible functions are ‘an integral part of, or closely connected with,
the functions of the Legislature or the Executive government’.131 This was present 
in Wilson, but in Grollo incompatibility was avoided by the judge maintaining an
arms-length distance from the executive, despite issuing the warrant in secretive,
ex parte proceedings.132 In addition to this characteristic, incompatibility is
indicated by either reliance upon ‘non-judicial instruction, advice or wish’ or the
exercise of discretion ‘on political grounds — that is, on grounds not expressly
or impliedly confi ned by law’.133 Grollo suggests, and subsequent cases have
confi rmed, that these criteria are also interpreted narrowly.134 The exercise of 
discretion on political grounds must be an express requirement of the role and 
is not established where the judge’s decision is simply unrestrained and may
126 Grollo (1995) 184 CLR 348, 365 (Brennan CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ).
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid 366.
129 Ibid 365.
130 Nicholas (1998) 193 CLR 173, 209–10 (Gaudron J), 224, 226 (McHugh J), 258 (Kirby J); Lacey, above
n 11, 76; Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181, 208–9 [44] (French CJ and Kiefel J); Steytler and Field, above
n 11, 231–2.
131 Wilson (1996) 189 CLR 1, 17 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ).
132 See McHugh J’s compelling dissent emphasising these aspects of the procedure in Grollo (1995) 184
CLR 348, 369–84 [26]–[40] (McHugh J).
133 Wilson (1996) 189 CLR 1, 17 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ).
134 See discussion below at Part III.B.
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involve administrative concerns.135 Reliance on executive instruction must also
be an express requirement and is not indicated by the condition that a decision
is based only on information received from the executive, or the withholding of 
executive evidence from the other party so it may not be tested.136 The key to
compatibility again appears to lie in the judge’s capacity to exercise an arms-
length independent review of the information presented.137
The High Court’s guidance in Grollo and Wilson provided the foundations for 
the development of an enforceable notion of incompatibility.138 As recently as
2011, Stellios argued that an incompatibility test ‘similar to that developed in
Wilson’ ought to be adopted in the federal sphere to replace the second separation 
rule.139 In keeping with the inherent fl exibility of this functionalist approach, the
guidance in Grollo and Wilson was not intended to provide a ‘test’ as such but 
merely to assist the development of this new standard. At the core of the meaning 
of incompatibility lies the test’s functionalist dedication to fl exibility. In contrast 
to the emphasis placed on discernible characteristics by the formalist separation 
rules, the High Court has described determining incompatibility as an ‘evaluative 
process’,140 ultimately considering whether the function infringes the ‘minimum
requirement’ that the judiciary be independent and impartial.141
Gummow J described the incompatibility test’s fl exibility as a ‘strength rather 
than a weakness’ enabling it to respond to ‘complex and varied statutory 
schemes’.142 Defi ning incompatibility rigidly by a strict set of criteria would carry 
the risk that parliaments could avoid invalidity by careful drafting, rendering this 
functionalist standard susceptible to formalistic application. Indeed, the formalist 
attempt to settle a core defi nition of branch powers has caused much of the 
controversy surrounding the separation rules outlined above.143 In interpreting 
the incompatibility test courts have been careful to confi ne their decisions to 
the facts presented. It can only be said that ‘this’ or ‘that’ kind of provision 
135 See International Finance Trust (2009) 240 CLR 319, 338 [4] (French CJ), 366–7 [96]–[98] (Gummow 
and Bell JJ), 384 [152], 385 [155], 386 [160] (Heydon J); Gypsy Jokers (2008) 234 CLR 532, 551 
[7] (Gleeson CJ), referring to the judgment of Crennan J and the joint judgment of Gummow, Hayne, 
Heydon and Kiefel JJ. See also discussion in Hussain (2008) 169 FCR 241, 268–9 [104]–[109]; South 
Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, 56 [100], 66 [142] (Gummow J) (‘Totani’); Forge v Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 76 [63] (Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ) 
(‘Forge’).
136 Grollo (1995) 184 CLR 348; Gypsy Jokers (2008) 234 CLR 532; K-Generation (2009) 237 CLR 501.
137 Gypsy Jokers (2008) 234 CLR 532, 560 (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ); K-Generation 
(2009) 237 CLR 501, 542–3 (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ); Wainohu (2011) 243 
CLR 181, 225 (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ).
138 See, eg, Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181, 196–208 [21]–[43], particularly 206 [39] (French CJ and Kiefel 
J), 225–6 [94] (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ); Momcilovic (2011) 245 CLR 1, 95–6 [183]–
[184] (Gummow J).
139 Stellios, ‘Reconceiving the Separation of Judicial Power’, above n 20, 135.
140 K-Generation (2009) 237 CLR 501, 530 [90] (French CJ).
141 North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley (2004) 218 CLR 146, 163 [29]–[30] 
(McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ) (‘Bradley’); Forge (2006) 228 CLR 45, 
67–8 [41] (Gleeson CJ); K-Generation (2009) 237 CLR 501, 544 [157] (Kirby J).
142 Fardon (2004) 223 CLR 575, 618 [105] (Gummow J).
143 Bateman, above n 81, 441.
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produces incompatibility whilst a general conception remains elusive.144 As the
Federal Court observed in 2008, ‘while the idea of incompatibility is familiar, its
application to different factual situations is not’.145
Acknowledging the court’s dedication to maintaining a fl exible standard, the
development of a core meaning of incompatibility may be observed. Recent 
incompatibility cases suggest incompatibility is established by the usurpation or 
control of a feature of the courts’ decisional independence.146 The applications of 
the incompatibility test in International Finance Trust and Totani each hinged 
upon provisions purporting to direct the court as to the manner and outcome
of the exercise of its powers. International Finance Trust concerned legislation
allowing the New South Wales Crime Commission to dictate to the Supreme
Court whether restraining order proceedings would take place ex parte and 
without notice to the respondent.147 Similarly, Totani concerned South Australian
control order legislation that obliged the Magistrates’ Court to issue an order 
upon fi nding an individual was a member of a ‘declared organisation’, the latter 
classifi cation having been determined solely by the executive.148
International Finance Trust and Totani align with precedent indicating that 
the maintenance of the court’s discretion and capacity to independently review
the relevant executive direction would have avoided incompatibility.149 In
K-Generation and Gypsy Jokers the High Court upheld the use of secret evidence
in judicial proceedings on the basis that the court was able to independently
review the secret classifi cation of the information.150
A recent case highlights both the fl exibility and continuity of the incompatibility
test. Wainohu concerned a challenge to the New South Wales control order 
legislation.151 The provisions compromised fair process in a number of respects.
An organisation could be ‘declared’ by a judge on the basis of undisclosed 
information in administrative proceedings not governed by the rules of 
evidence.152 Subsequent Supreme Court control order proceedings hinged upon
144 See Nicholas (1998) 193 CLR 173, 256; Forge (2006) 228 CLR 45, 76; Bradley (2004) 218 CLR 146,
163; Fardon (2004) 223 CLR 575, 618–9; K-Generation (2009) 237 CLR 501, 530; Steytler and Field, 
above n 11, 235; Hardcastle, above n 19, 37. The same has been acknowledged of judicial power: see
generally above nn 53–4.
145 Hussain (2008) 169 FCR 241, 261 [71].
146 See, eg, Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, 43 [62] (French CJ).
147 Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW); International Finance Trust (2009) 240 CLR 319, 355
(French CJ), 364, 366–7 (Gummow and Bell JJ), 385–6 (Heydon J). Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ
dissented, adopting a different interpretation of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW): at 375.
148 Serious and Organised Crime Control Act 2008 (SA) s 14(1); Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, 21 (French 
CJ), 55–7 (Gummow J), 153, 159–60 (Crennan and Bell JJ), 171–2 (Kiefel J). The Court suggested that 
replacing the obligation with a discretion would have remedied the incompatibility: at 56–7 (Gummow
J), 88–9 [226]–[228] (Hayne J), 160 [435]–[436] (Kiefel J).
149 International Finance Trust (2009) 240 CLR 319, 354–5 (French CJ); Gypsy Jokers (2008) 234 CLR 
532; K-Generation (2009) 237 CLR 501.
150 Gypsy Jokers (2008) 234 CLR 532, 560 (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ); K-Generation
(2009) 237 CLR 501, 542–3 (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ).
151 (2011) 243 CLR 181; Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2009 (NSW). See generally Welsh,
above n 122. 
152 Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2009 (NSW) ss 8, 13(1), 28–9.
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this declaration. Incompatibility was established, this time based solely on a
provision removing the judge’s duty to give reasons for his or her decision to
declare an organisation.153 However, under the Wainohu scheme the judge could 
have avoided incompatibility by providing reasons nonetheless. For a majority
of the Court the giving of reasons was so fundamental to the judge’s actual
and perceived decisional independence that the removal of the obligation was
suffi cient to create incompatibility.154 Crucial to the Court’s reasons in Wainohu
was the fact that the declaration was issued by a judge acting persona designata
in proceedings with the appearance of open court. The judge’s decision to declare
an organisation involved important determinations of fact and enlivened the
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to issue control orders in relation to the declared 
organisation and those associated with it.155 It is not clear whether removing
the appearance of open court from the declaration proceedings and allowing
the judge to issue the declaration behind closed doors (as in Grollo) would have
avoided incompatibility.156
The incompatibility cases demonstrate that the concept is certainly fl exible,
context specifi c and inapt for exhaustive defi nition or tests. This presents a
conceptual challenge. Heydon J noted that ‘intermediate appellate courts have
found [the incompatibility test] diffi cult to understand’.157 Professor Chris
Steytler and Iain Field likewise observe that ‘practitioners, lawmakers, students
and teachers of constitutional law alike have struggled to make sense of’ the
concept of incompatibility.158 This lack of clarity around incompatibility does
not necessarily mean the standard is unworkable. The cases show that refi nement 
of the meaning of incompatibility has been possible: incompatibility appears to
require that the essential characteristics of an independent court are retained, and 
that the court is not required to make a political decision or act at the whim of the
executive. 
B  Is Incompatibility Insubstantial?
The incompatibility test’s functionalist dedication to fl exibility gives a court 
considerable room to manoeuvre in its interpretations while preserving the
substantive nature of the test. Incompatibility may be interpreted widely, giving
substantive protection to fair process and equality considerations and taking
153 Ibid s 13(2); Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181, 192 [7] (French CJ and Kiefel J), 229–30 [109] (Gummow, 
Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ).
154 Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181, 192 [7], 213 [53], 215 [58]–[59], 219–20 [69] (French CJ and Kiefel J).
Cf Heydon J’s dissenting views: at 238–41 [147]–[154].
155 Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181, 192 [7], 215 [58]–[59], 218–20 [66]–[69] (French CJ and Kiefel J).
It was on this basis that the Court concluded s 13(2) effectively rendered the entire Crimes (Criminal 
Organisations Control) Act 2009 (NSW) invalid: at 220 [71] (French CJ and Kiefel J), 231 [115]
(Heydon J).
156 Welsh, above n 122, 264.
157 Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, 95 (Heydon J).
158 Steytler and Field, above n 11, 228.
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public confi dence in courts and changing community values into account.159
Incompatibility may also be interpreted narrowly, preventing only clear 
usurpations of judicial independence and aligning institutional integrity with a
minimalist conception of the essential or defi ning features of courts.160 Despite
commentators emphasising the doctrine’s potential breadth,161 High Court 
decisions have tended to lean strongly towards the latter approach.162
The Court in Kable indicated that incompatibility may be established by
circumstances in which the rights and liberties of citizens were severely affected 
by judicial proceedings lacking the hallmarks of fair process.163 This substantive
conception of the incompatibility test, in which fair process values found clear 
articulation, was not born out in the cases that followed. In fact the incompatibility
test was not applied again until International Finance Trust in 2010, despite a 
string of attempts to rely on the rule. In an oft-quoted statement Kirby J suggested 
the Kable rule may be ‘a constitutional guard dog that would bark but once’164 and 
Gageler J, prior to his elevation to the High Court bench, later put to Kirby J in
argument that any furtherance of the Kable rule was like asking the dog ‘to turn 
on the family’.165
The minimal scope of Kable incompatibility was confi rmed in 2004 when
the High Court in Fardon upheld a substantially similar preventive detention
regime.166 As noted above, a key point of distinction relied upon to support the 
different outcomes in the two cases was that the New South Wales Act invalidated 
in Kable was ad hominem,167 whereas the Queensland Act in Fardon was of 
general application.168 The substantial overlap in the facts of Fardon and Kable
indicated, for McHugh J, that Kable was a decision of ‘very limited application’
and the combination of circumstances that gave rise to incompatibility in that 
case was ‘unlikely to be repeated’.169 The distinctions between Kable and Fardon
were relatively minor, and demonstrated that incompatibility was indeed reserved 
159 Mason, above n 3, 8; Bateman, above n 81, 440–1; Wheeler, ‘Due Process’, above n 15, 220–4.
160 Steytler and Field, above n 11, 233–4.
161 Mason, above n 3, 8; Bateman, above n 81, 440–1; Wheeler, ‘Due Process’, above n 15, 220–4.
162 See the Federal Court’s lengthy description of the development of the incompatibility test in Hussain
(2008) 169 FCR 241, 261–73.
163 Kable (1996) 189 CLR 51, 98 (Toohey J), 106–7 (Gaudron J), 122–3 (McHugh J), 131–2 (Gummow J); 
Fardon (2004) 223 CLR 575, 655 (Callinan and Heydon JJ).
164 Baker v The Queen (2004) 233 CLR 513, 535 (Kirby J).
165 Transcript of Proceedings, Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2006] HCATrans
25 (8 February 2006).
166 Fardon (2004) 223 CLR 575; Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld).
167 Community Protection Act 1994 (NSW) s 3(3).
168 Fardon (2004) 223 CLR 575, 591 [16] (Gleeson CJ), 595−6 [33] (McHugh J), 658 [233] (Callinan
and Heydon JJ). Kirby J also acknowledged this distinction, referring to the Queensland Act as ‘one of 
apparently general application’, but commented that it was ‘unthinkable’ that Kable was a ‘stand-alone
decision … limited to one case’: at 629 [144].
169 Ibid 601 (McHugh J). See also Hussain (2008) 169 FCR 241, 267.
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for extreme cases, such as the judicial implementation of ad hominem legislation
or the appointment of a judge as Ministerial advisor.170
Following Fardon, cases reinforced the narrowness of the incompatibility test.171
By 2009 the incompatibility test had only been applied in Wilson and Kable and it 
appeared as though nothing but the most egregious affront to judicial independence
would qualify as incompatible. K-Generation, Gypsy Jokers, International 
Finance Trust and Totani confi rmed that preserving an arms-length degree of 
decisional independence is suffi cient to overcome potential incompatibility.
Later cases reinforced the suggestion in Grollo and Wilson that maintaining a
relatively formal sense of independence — by which the judge is not forced into
an unavoidable confl ict, integrated into the political branches or instructed to
make political decisions — will avoid incompatibility. Intrusions into openness,
fairness and equality by, for example, ex parte proceedings, secret evidence and 
decisions based on information not governed by the rules of evidence have all
been tolerated under the test, even where the power results in severe incursions on
rights or liberties.172 This led Heydon J to observe in Totani that the due process
implications of the test were ‘apparently dormant’173 and Kirby J to state in Gypsy
Jokers that the incompatibility test has been ‘under-performing’ in this respect.174
In those cases where incompatibility was established, the decision rested on
a single provision, in Totani a single word. In recent cases the Court has been 
unusually explicit about how the provisions in question could be amended to
remedy the incompatibility.175 None of the Court’s suggested changes alter the
schemes in a substantive manner; they merely reinstate the minimum standard 
of judicial control over proceedings or, in Wainohu, the giving of reasons for a
decision made with the appearance of open court. 
It is diffi cult to say whether Wainohu presents a slight widening of the incompatibility
standard or simply a decision based on particular, rare, contextual considerations
(such as the exercise of functions by a judge in the appearance of open court 
as a precursor to Supreme Court proceedings). In any case incompatibility in
Wainohu also rested on a single provision compromising an essential feature of 
the court’s independence. Ultimately the case law demonstrates that only clear 
170 For a critique of Fardon, see generally Anthony Gray, ‘Standard of Proof, Unpredictable Behaviour and 
the High Court of Australia’s Verdict on Preventative Detention Laws’ (2005) 10 Deakin Law Review
177; Patrick Keyzer, ‘Preserving Due Process or Warehousing the Undesirables: To What End the
Separation of Judicial Power of the Commonwealth?’ (2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 100.
171 For discussion, see Gabrielle J Appleby and John M Williams, ‘A New Coat of Paint: Law and Order 
and the Refurbishment of Kable’ (2012) 40 Federal Law Review 1, 8.
172 Grollo (1995) 184 CLR 348; Hilton (1985) 157 CLR 57; Hussain (2008) 169 FCR 241, 268; Totani
(2010) 242 CLR 1.
173 Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, 95 (Heydon J).
174 Gypsy Jokers (2008) 234 CLR 532, 563 (Kirby J), quoting Wheeler, ‘The Kable Doctrine’, above n 104, 
30.
175 International Finance Trust (2009) 240 CLR 319, 355 (French CJ), 364 (Gummow and Bell JJ), 385
(Heydon J); Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, 56 [100] (Gummow J), 88–90 [226]–[229] (Hayne J), 160 [435]–
[436] (Crennan and Bell JJ); Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181, 220 [70] (French CJ and Kiefel J).
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usurpations or severe intrusions into the independence of the judiciary will cause
incompatibility.176
Despite rousing dissents in Grollo and Fardon advocating a broader interpretation
of the test, case after case has reinforced its narrowness. This narrow interpretation
permits the incremental attrition of the separation of judicial power, and also
arguably poses little obstacle to clear affronts to judicial independence and 
impartiality.177
When applying the test in recent cases, the High Court has not revisited previous
authorities and continues to apply the narrow standard.178 There is nothing to
suggest that if an incompatibility test was adopted to replace the second separation
rule it would be freed from the prevailing narrow interpretation. Indeed, some
commentators advocate the explicit adoption of the same test.179 Both the Court’s
reticence to revisit past cases and its willingness to identify incompatibility as
a singular concept180 indicate that a functionalist incompatibility test to replace
the second separation rule would be the same test developed in the Kable and 
Grollo lines of cases.181 The fl exibility of the incompatibility test would ensure
that the different contextual features applying to federal courts would play a
role in any incompatibility analysis. However, it can be confi dently surmised 
that if an incompatibility test replaced the second separation rule this ‘under-
performing’182 test ‘of very limited application’183 would provide a weak protection 
to constitutional values and present a clear danger to the separation of judicial
power and its purposes. 
It is possible that the narrowness that characterises the incompatibility test may
simply be the result of particular styles of judging and not actually indicate this
functionalist test is less apt than the existing formalist test to achieve the purposes
of Chapter III. However, in the next section I argue that the inherent functionalist 
foundations of the incompatibility test have facilitated its development into an
insubstantial protection for constitutional values.
176 Steytler and Field, above n 11, 238.
177 See, eg, the critique of Fardon in Gray, above n 170; Keyzer, above n 170. Cf Fardon (2004) 223 CLR 
575, 592 (Gleeson CJ), 600–1 (McHugh J), 658 (Callinan and Heydon JJ).
178 Steytler and Field, above n 11, 238. Cf Appleby and Williams, above n 171, 28 in which the authors
assert that the High Court has ‘reinvigorated’ the Kable doctrine, acknowledging the recent cases ‘have
done little to settle the debates as to its basis or scope’; Brendan Lim, ‘Attributes and Attribution of State
Courts — Federalism and the Kable Principle’ (2012) 40 Federal Law Review 31, in which the author 
asserts that the recent applications of the incompatibility test refl ect a shifting emphasis in the test’s
theoretical underpinnings. 
179 Stellios, ‘Reconceiving the Separation of Judicial Power’, above n 20, 129–130.
180 Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181, 228 (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ); Welsh, above n 122, 259;
Steytler and Field, above n 11, 244. See also the application of the Wilson test in Momcilovic (2011) 245
CLR 1, 95–6 [183]–[184] (Gummow J).
181 Welsh, above n 122, 263. See, eg, Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181, 217–18 (French CJ and Kiefel J),
225–6 (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ); Momcilovic (2011) 245 CLR 1, 95–6 [183]–[184]
(Gummow J).
182 Gypsy Jokers (2008) 234 CLR 532, 563 (Kirby J), quoting Wheeler, ‘The Kable Doctrine’, above n 104, 
30.
183 Fardon (2004) 223 CLR 575, 601 (McHugh J); Hussain (2008) 169 FCR 241, 267.
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C  Can the Functionalist Approach Achieve Independence
and Impartiality?
At the core of the functionalist incompatibility test is the rationale that powers
may be conferred on multiple branches of government unless the conferral is
demonstrated to impede institutional independence or integrity. Unlike formalist 
tests which seek proof of particular characteristics before permitting a function
to be conferred on the judicature, a functionalist test allows the conferral before
looking for offending characteristics. Thus, the functionalist starting point is one
of permissiveness; its guiding ethos is fl exibility.
The permissiveness underpinning the functionalist approach undermines the
prophylactic nature of the separation of judicial powers.184 Small affronts to the
judicial independence and impartiality that fail to reach the considerable standard 
of ‘incompatible with judicial independence and integrity’ are permitted under 
the functionalist incompatibility test. The legitimisation of these small affronts
creates the potential for a snowball effect and the incremental erosion of the
separation of powers.185
The potential breadth of the test indicated in Wilson and Kable narrowed with each 
unsuccessful attempt to argue incompatibility that followed. The limited scope 
of the test is now refl ected in the incredibly narrow bases on which the recent 
incompatibility decisions rest. Each case not only interpreted the incompatible 
characteristics of power, but legitimised other characteristics as compatible. 
Thus the use of risk assessment-based preventive detention, secret evidence and 
closed proceedings resulting in intrusive orders are highly unlikely to feature 
weightily in determinations of incompatibility following their legitimisation as 
‘compatible’ in Fardon, Gypsy Jokers and Grollo respectively. The ambit of the 
range of functions exercisable by the judicature, and the range of ways in which 
Parliament may control the exercise of those functions, increases but is not easily 
contracted, as to do so would be inconsistent with pre-existing authorities. The 
result has been the evolution of a relatively ineffective protection for judicial 
independence and impartiality under which even the basic fair process and 
equality of proceedings is diffi cult to protect from legislative interference. 
It is the inherent permissiveness of the functionalist test that facilitates the 
legitimisation of relatively minor affronts to judicial independence and impartiality 
and enables the separation of judicial power to be steadily undermined.186
Judicial enforcement of a robust conception of incompatibility may succeed in
achieving the purposes of Chapter III but, nonetheless, will continue to adhere to
fl exibility and permissiveness rather than rigidity and caution. It is highly likely
such an approach will evolve in a manner that gradually narrows the concept of 
incompatibility into eventual insignifi cance — as witnessed in the post-Kable
incompatibility cases — and permits greater and greater compromises to judicial
184 Redish, above n 6, 306.
185 Ibid; Walker, above n 27, 161.
186 Redish, above n 6, 100.
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independence and impartiality. The risk that this will occur is a severe and 
inherent weakness of the functionalist approach. 
It is clear enough that the High Court imbues fl exibility into almost any test it 
determines, preserving a degree of discretion to enable adaptability in the long
term. When fundamental constitutional values are at stake the development of the
incompatibility test demonstrates that an inherently permissive test interpreted 
fl exibly is apt to become so permissive it provides barely any protection at all in the
longer term. This is a primary formalist criticism of functionalist approaches, and 
it describes the development of the incompatibility test in Australia. Undoubtedly
the incompatibility test’s direct engagement with the purposes of Chapter III is
an important advantage in achieving judicial independence and impartiality. The
challenge becomes coupling this direct engagement with a strong and less fl exible
approach, so this strength is not whittled down over time. 
IV  PURPOSIVE FORMALISM: A TWO-TIERED APPROACH
Thus far I have discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the prevailing formalist 
and functionalist tests in their potential to achieve the purposes of Chapter III. The
formalist separation rules are far from ideal, but they have been more successful
than the functionalist incompatibility test in providing an appropriately strong
and reliable protection for judicial independence and impartiality. The criticisms
of formalism are well-founded but perhaps not insurmountable, whereas the
weaknesses in the incompatibility test arise from its functionalist nature and are
unavoidable. Is there a workable framework that accommodates the strengths of 
each approach without compounding their weaknesses? This Part of the article
proposes such an approach, a two-tiered method of ‘purposive formalism’.
In essence purposive formalism adopts the formalist separation rules, with the
addition of a purposive inquiry interrogating whether a power is compatible with
judicial independence and impartiality. The design of the method is outlined 
below. First, however, it is helpful to briefl y explain the logic behind the label
‘purposive formalism’. All formalism is of course purposive, in that no formalist 
claims the separation of functions ought to occur for its own sake.187 That said,
formalist approaches to Chapter III may be appreciated as existing on a spectrum.
At one end of the spectrum exists a passive approach to the purposive nature of 
Chapter III, assuming defi nition alone will achieve judicial independence and 
impartiality and that engagement directly with those concepts is unnecessary.
A decision-maker adopting this approach will begin and end their reasoning by
seeking to defi ne the function at hand. The success of this formalist approach
is thus entirely dependent on the susceptibility of judicial power to precise and 
enforceable defi nition. At this end of the formalism spectrum the weaknesses
of the separation rules are apparent. Limitations in the defi nition of judicial
power become weaknesses in the capacity of the rules to achieve their purposes
187 Gerangelos, ‘Interpretational Methodology’, above n 3, 9.
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and a formalistic neglect of principled considerations places the rules at risk of 
developing in a technical manner at odds with the core aims of Chapter III. At 
the other end of the formalism spectrum lies an actively purposive approach:
‘purposive formalism’. Purposive formalism acknowledges that defi ning a
function is not apt to form the entire task of the separation rules, as functions are
not always susceptible to precise defi nition. It also acknowledges the purposive
nature of Chapter III by introducing a mechanism through which purposive
considerations may play a clear and signifi cant role in the analysis. 
The basic purposive formalist framework is as follows. Two questions are posed 
in order to determine Chapter III validity. 
1. Is the function judicial or non-judicial? —The fi rst ‘defi nition’ limb. 
Then, if the power is not susceptible to clear defi nition:
2. Is the conferral of the function compatible with the independence and 
impartiality of the judicial institution? —The second ‘compatibility’ limb.
Purposive formalism is fundamentally formalist. First and foremost purposive
formalism contends that powers ought not be vested in courts unless they contain
the defi ning characteristics of judicial power, as developed in the extensive
body of case law. A clear answer to this fi rst question according to the accepted 
characteristics of judicial power will determine the allocation of power conclusively.
This retains the prophylactic potential of the formalist separation rules by ensuring
that functions capable of clear defi nition are assigned on that basis, and that other 
considerations are not invoked to vary or confuse that determination. By being
grounded in formalism’s caution and fundamental rigidity, purposive formalism
avoids the incremental erosion of judicial independence and impartiality caused 
by functionalism’s inherent permissiveness and fl exibility. 
Purposive formalism still faces the considerable challenge of accounting for the
limitations of the formalist separation rules: fi rst, the resolution of cases concerning
penumbral powers and, second, the rules’ failure to provide a clear avenue for 
considering the impact of a conferral of power on judicial independence and 
impartiality. In order to address these weaknesses purposive formalism engages
a second tier of inquiry beyond considering the defi nition of a power. Only if the
nature of the function remains unclear is the second question engaged: ‘is the
conferral of the function compatible with the independence and impartiality of 
the judicial institution?’ The two-tiered framework assists purposive formalism
to go further than merely determining the allocation of judicial and non-judicial
functions. It acknowledges and allocates functions in Zines’ third category
of powers insusceptible to defi nition as either judicial or non-judicial, that is,
penumbral powers.188
The second ‘compatibility limb’ of purposive formalism is clearly an adaptation
of the functionalist incompatibility test. Crucially, the compatibility question is
phrased in the positive: is the function compatible, rather than is it incompatible.
188 Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, above n 20, 221–2; Ratnapala, above n 57, 124.
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This is an important distinction. It places a positive burden on the identifi cation
of compatible features of the power, upon which validity depends. The
incompatibility test works in the opposite way. That test calls for the identifi cation
of incompatible features and presumes the power is otherwise valid. The existing
Grollo and Kable lines of authority may guide the court as to the outer-limits of 
compatibility, but purposive formalism’s second limb calls for the evolution of a
jurisprudence of compatibility centred on more comprehensive understandings of 
the constitutional concepts of judicial independence and impartiality. 
Purposive formalism compels courts to engage openly, accountably and 
consistently with the principled aspect of Chapter III. In incompatibility cases
this substantive open engagement is clouded (even overwhelmed) by a focus on
indicators of incompatibility, such as usurpation, the essential nature of a feature
or whether the judge is obligated to act in a political manner. In cases applying
the separation rules there has simply been no requirement that courts engage
openly or consistently with the purposes of Chapter III. By requiring courts to
resolve diffi cult questions as to the allocation of powers by clear reference to the
core constitutional values of judicial independence and impartiality, purposive
formalism holds potential as an advancement in the accountability and reasoning
of the court and in the achievement of those values.
Purposive formalism presents a signifi cant development, but one that builds upon
existing authorities. Various decisions of Kirby, Gaudron and Deane JJ refl ect 
aspects of the purposive formalist approach to the separation rules insofar as
each justice has displayed an active engagement with the purposes of Chapter 
III in their reasons, at times drawing on these purposes to determine the issue at 
hand.189 That said, approaches to the purposive aspect of Chapter III have been
inconsistent. Purposive formalism is proposed as a new framework to encourage
consistency in the interpretation of Chapter III and to legitimise constrained,
clear and direct engagement with the purposive aspect of Chapter III in the
determination of separation of judicial power cases.
By coupling the strictness of the separation rules with the principled engagement 
of a compatibility test, purposive formalism may provide a mechanism for 
better achieving the purposes of Chapter III. There are three potential criticisms
of purposive formalism that deserve particular consideration and provide an
opportunity to elaborate the approach in more detail. Firstly, it may be said that 
engaging both concepts of judicial power and compatibility risks compounding
the ambiguities inherent in each concept and supporting unpredictable, highly
discretionary or unguided decisions. Secondly, purposive formalism may simply
incorporate the insubstantial and narrow concept of incompatibility arising from
the Kable and Grollo lines of cases to govern the second ‘compatibility’ limb.
Thirdly, as neither the separation rules nor the incompatibility test have been
189 Wheeler, ‘Due Process’, above n 15. See, eg, Nicholas (1998) 193 CLR 173, 208–9 (Gaudron J); 
Polyukovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 607 (Deane J); Thomas (2007) 233 CLR 307, 433–6 (Kirby J). Cf the
judgment of Gleeson CJ in Thomas (2007) 233 CLR 307, 335, where his Honour dealt with the question 
of whether the provisions authorised the exercise of judicial power in a manner contrary to Chapter III
briefl y.
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particularly successful at protecting fair process in judicial proceedings, how
could purposive formalism possibly succeed in doing so simply by harnessing
both tests?
A  Compounding Imprecision?
Purposive formalism combines the separation rules with a compatibility test;
does this not simply compound the weaknesses of each approach? In particular,
neither judicial power nor (in)compatibility is susceptible to precise or exhaustive
defi nition — won’t a test that invokes both these concepts suffer from compounded 
imprecision? 
The strength of the purposive formalist approach lies in the tiered nature of its
analysis. The compatibility limb is only engaged to resolve cases that cannot be
resolved at the defi nition limb. If a power is capable of defi nition as exclusively
judicial or non-judicial by recourse to the characteristics of judicial power,
this will resolve the constitutional question entirely. However, as the foregoing
discussion reveals, powers are not always susceptible to suffi ciently precise
defi nition. In such cases some other, additional factor is required to determine
the proper allocation of the power. Otherwise the decision maker may be
compelled to stretch the characteristics of judicial power or seek some other ad 
hoc consideration to determine the issue. Under a purposive formalist approach
the compatibility limb provides this additional factor.
As the compatibility limb has a secondary status it acts only as a refi ning element,
helping to resolve ambiguities. It does not provide an alternative element by
which the ambiguities and weaknesses of each standard may be compounded.
Each of the concepts employed remains broad and will be subject to differing
interpretations, but will be guided by existing authorities. In this way, the standards
are structured to enable one to limit the other. Specifi cally, it enables the standard 
of compatibility to limit the scope of penumbral powers exercisable by courts.
By utilising the compatibility standard to refi ne ambiguities as to defi nition,
purposive formalism goes some way to addressing the weaknesses of imprecision
existing under the formalist separation rules and functionalist incompatibility
test. This does not create a perfect method, but certainly a preferable one. 
B  Overcoming the Narrowness of Incompatibility
The compatibility element of purposive formalism is adapted from the
incompatibility test, so won’t it suffer the same weaknesses as the incompatibility
test in the state court and persona designata contexts? Will the compatibility
limb permit all but the most extreme affronts to independence and impartiality,
leading to the incremental erosion of the separation of judicial powers?
The meaning of compatibility in the purposive formalist test is diffi cult to address
in the abstract. It might be said that compatibility with judicial independence
and impartiality would require that a power aligns with the rule of law and 
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other basic aims of the separation of federal judicial power discussed in Part III.
However, one cannot predict just how a court adopting the purposive formalist 
approach would interpret compatibility. It would certainly be open to a court to
interpret compatibility to mean not-incompatibility, and draw upon the Grollo 
and Kable lines of cases to inform that understanding. This would, in effect,
permit all but grossly incompatible functions to come within the ambit of judicial
power, broadening the penumbra of judicial power and bringing about the kind 
of incremental erosion seen in those contexts where the incompatibility test 
governs the conferral of powers. Such an approach would not advance purposive
formalism’s capacity to achieve judicial independence and impartiality. Arguably
it would pose no greater threat to these values than the replacement of the second 
separation rule with an incompatibility test; or reliance on parliamentary intent or 
imperfect analogies to determine diffi cult cases.190 Nonetheless, the compatibility
limb is not designed to mimic the incompatibility test, and there are good reasons
why a more substantial concept of compatibility would be developed in the
purposive formalism context. 
Crucially the starting point in the compatibility limb is not one of permissiveness,
but of caution. The compatibility limb determines the allocation of powers
not established as judicial. As this is a formalist test such powers may not be
conferred on courts. The rationale behind the compatibility limb is that uncertain,
penumbral powers may not be conferred on courts unless they are demonstrably 
compatible with judicial independence and impartiality. In this way it is
opposite to the incompatibility test’s presumption of validity in the absence of 
demonstrated incompatibility. Unlike the incompatibility test, the compatibility
limb is not an exception to an exception, as has been cumbersomely adopted in
the persona designata context. Nor is it an exception to a rule, as in the state
court context. Due to its exceptional nature and its underlying functionalist 
permissiveness the incompatibility test presumes a function is validly conferred 
and then seeks proof of incompatibility. On the other hand, the compatibility limb
presumes the function may not be conferred on the judiciary unless it is proved 
to be compatible with judicial independence and impartiality. Thus it requires
substantive development of the meaning of compatibility.
The incompatibility cases may guide the development of the compatibility
limb by indicating the characteristics of functions that are incompatible, such
as usurpation of an element of decisional independence, executive control of a
power or its exercise, or the integration of a judge into the non-judicial branches.
However, in interpreting the compatibility limb of purposive formalism the court 
would need to look beyond this relatively narrow set of criteria and develop a
jurisprudence of compatibility.
Considering the aims of the separation of judicial power outlined in the
Introduction to this article, compatible functions would preserve equality, justice
and confi dence in the legal system as well as upholding the constitutional compact 
more broadly by, for example, ensuring political functions are vested in the
190 As argued above in Part II.A.
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representative branches. Thus, the compatibility limb has the capacity to support 
a more complete, substantive development of the notions of judicial independence
and impartiality. This fresh conception of independence and impartiality could 
facilitate a renewed focus on the role an independent and impartial federal
judicature serves in achieving fundamental constitutional aims such as the rule
of law, equality and the preservation of liberty. The concept of compatibility
could conceivably develop more freely and substantively within its limited role of 
patrolling the grey-areas of judicial power. Its presence would also give history
and parliamentary intent a clearer, more appropriate place in the reasoning
process. These considerations would play a part in the analysis whilst remaining
secondary to the ultimately determinative compatibility standard. Thus purposive
formalism provides the court with an opportunity to meaningfully engage with
the purposes of Chapter III within the formalist framework. To simply adopt 
the existing incompatibility test to determine the second tier of the purposive
formalist test would be at odds with the role and nature of the compatibility
limb, and neglect an opportunity to develop a substantive, purposive Chapter III
jurisprudence. 
C  Protecting Fair Process
Neither the separation rules nor the incompatibility test have been particularly
successful at protecting substantive fair process in judicial proceedings. The
separation rules accommodate fair process awkwardly. The incompatibility test 
has maintained a narrow focus on independence rather than on more substantial
notions of impartiality and fairness. How then might purposive formalism fare in
protecting fair process in federal court proceedings?
The compatibility limb of purposive formalism provides the clear avenue
for addressing fair process protections that is lacking in the separation rules.
Moreover, the compatibility limb is designed to facilitate more substantive
consideration of the impact of a power on judicial independence and impartiality
than the present incompatibility test. Through this clear avenue for substantive
analysis, the compatibility limb incorporates attentiveness to the impact of 
the function on the perceived impartiality of the proceedings, in the sense that 
this perception equates to the court’s capacity to protect its processes.191 If the
equality or fairness of judicial proceedings is compromised, the independence
and impartiality of courts may be challenged and faith in courts as impartial
arbiters of justice diminished.192 Through the application of the compatibility
limb, functions that are questionably judicial and are exercised in a manner that 
compromises equality, fairness, or otherwise impacts the perception of judicial
independence and impartiality will not pass constitutional muster.
Fair process will also continue to play a role in Chapter III cases concerning
functions that do not reach the compatibility limb of analysis. The existing
191 Lacey, above n 11, 76.
192 Brennan, above n 78, 16–18.
A Path to Purposive Formalism: Interpreting Chapter III for Judicial Independence and 
Impartiality
101
precedent indicating that fundamental aspects of fair process may form essential
features of ‘courts’ or of ‘judicial power’ would not be undermined. A clearly non-
judicial power could not be conferred on a court. A questionably judicial power 
would face the more substantive test of whether its exercise compromised broader 
notions of judicial independence and impartiality. Placing the compatibility
inquiry in a second tier acknowledges that penumbral powers present the greatest 
risk of eroding judicial independence and impartiality and deserve particular 
interrogation for their potential impact on fair and proper processes. Compromises
to fair process — such as ex parte hearings without notice or the use of secret 
evidence — may be in keeping with the independence and impartiality of courts
in the context of, for example, a criminal trial. After all, such trials attract the
wealth of associated protections for the rights of the accused. When a function is
unusual — such as where it involves the creation of rights absent a controversy or 
incarceration outside the trial process — the compatibility element calls for more
comprehensive compliance with accepted standards of fair process and natural
justice if that function is to be exercisable by courts.
Exactly what kinds of fair process protections might arise under the compatibility
limb of purposive formalism cannot be foreseen with any precision. Gaudron J
describes fair judicial process as incorporating openness, natural justice and the
application of law to ascertainable facts.193 Jurisprudence regarding constitutional
fair process protections in Australia remains sparse. There is a great, unrealised 
potential for the development of an Australian conception of fair process. That 
said, it must be acknowledged that any fair process protections derived from
Chapter III will focus on the independence of the court, rather than on the
rights of individual parties.194 For example, in cases upholding the use of secret 
evidence in judicial proceedings the decisive issue was whether the court was
able to independently assess the classifi cation of the material, not on the impact 
of secrecy on the party from whom the evidence was withheld.195 In many cases 
the concerns of judicial independence and party rights may overlap, but there
is limited capacity for a comprehensive set of fair process rights, of the kind 
seen in nations such as the United States that have constitutional due process
clauses, to evolve from Chapter III.196 Notwithstanding this, Chapter III remains
the only avenue for the constitutional protection of fair judicial process and, as
such, it is imperative that it is interpreted to enable courts to give clarity to this
area as well as substantive consideration and weight to preserving the fairness,
openness and equality of their proceedings.197 Purposive formalism presents
a clear avenue through which the jurisprudence of fair process, as it relates to
judicial independence and impartiality, can evolve.
193 Nolan (1991) 172 CLR 460, 496 (Gaudron J), quoted in Fardon (2004) 223 CLR 575, 615 [92]
(Gummow J).
194 Lacey, above n 11, 60.
195 Gypsy Jokers (2008) 234 CLR 532; K-Generation (2009) 237 CLR 501.
196 For discussion of Chapter III’s limited capacity to protect ‘rights’, see Lacey, above n 11, 60.
197 Ibid.
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D  Does Purposive Formalism Achieve Independence and 
Impartiality?
Purposive formalism is by no means an infallible mechanism for achieving
judicial independence and impartiality. The foregoing discussion leaves many
questions unanswered. How will the court interpret compatibility? What exactly
is required by judicial independence and impartiality? How might the purposive
formalist approach apply to many examples of controversial powers? There are
risks in the approach and it undoubtedly has its weaknesses as a mechanism for 
the achievement of judicial independence and impartiality. At a broader level,
the natural widening effect of judicial interpretation and government innovation
means it will always be easier for the penumbra of judicial power to grow than
shrink, as this requires a more radical step. Nonetheless purposive formalism
has two key advantages that together render it a preferred method of achieving
judicial independence and impartiality. 
First, the risks of purposive formalism are less than those presented by
the formalist separation rules or the functionalist incompatibility test. The
two-tiered framework avoids the incremental erosion stemming from the
functionalist incompatibility test’s underlying permissiveness. It also enables
direct engagement with judicial independence and impartiality to address the
weaknesses in the separation rules, without compounding the imprecision of each
set of standards. Purposive formalism addresses the inadequacy of the defi nition
of judicial power by engaging a compatibility test to determine the allocation of 
functions insusceptible to precise defi nition. The approach also addresses the risk 
of the separation rules developing in a manner at odds with constitutional values
by providing for direct consideration of those values in the second compatibility
limb of the analysis. 
Second, purposive formalism clarifi es the role of principled considerations in
Chapter III analyses and compels courts to engage openly, accountably and 
consistently with the core purpose of Chapter III. Purposive formalism requires
a fresh jurisprudence of compatibility, positively framed to propel engagement 
with the meaning and aims of independence and impartiality, rather than
focusing upon offensive incompatible features. The compatibility limb thus has
the capacity to be more substantive and therefore more capable of achieving
judicial independence and impartiality than the existing incompatibility test.
The two-tiered framework facilitates this principled, purposive engagement 
without undermining the basic prophylactic strength of the separation rules. In
this way purposive formalism presents a clear picture of the role of each separate
consideration in determining Chapter III validity. The defi nition of the power is
of prime importance, principled engagement with the purposive aspect of Chapter 
III is secondary, and of lesser weight are further factors such as historic analogy
and parliamentary intent.
Purposive formalism is simply proposed as a preferred approach, one that offers
a better chance of achieving the fundamental purposes of Chapter III than either 
the formalist separation rules or functionalist incompatibility test. The analysis
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of purposive formalism has been theoretical, speaking broadly and at the point of 
abstraction. As to how purposive formalism may play out with respect to specifi c
functions, this is a task for further research. A few points may be made in the
abstract however. Firstly, the purposive formalist approach is proposed to offer 
the best means of achieving judicial independence and impartiality in the longer 
term. As such it may appear to produce unexpected results in particular cases.
This stems from its fundamentally formalist nature, which has been justifi ed in
the course of this article. Secondly, purposive formalism leaves the decision-
maker with room to manoeuvre. Reasonable minds may, and do, differ as to the
meaning of judicial power and judicial independence and impartiality. Whilst 
this ambiguity creates a risk of concepts being interpreted in a way that may
prevent purposive formalism from achieving the purposes of Chapter III, the
existence of some fl exibility is important to preserve. The powers of government 
evolve over time and must be allowed to do so. Constraining the court too much
in its interpretation of the separation of judicial power may stunt this evolution
or, critically, enable parliaments to avoid Chapter III limits on their powers by
employing formalistic drafting tricks and techniques. Purposive formalism
acknowledges that constraining the court further may not be the way forward in
achieving judicial independence and impartiality under Chapter III. Requiring
the court to openly and directly engage with the purposes of Chapter III in a clear 
and constrained fashion may well be a step in the right direction. 
The adoption of purposive formalism would present a signifi cant development 
built upon existing doctrine. Purposive formalism is a reconceptualisation and 
rebuilding of the formalist approach to the separation of federal judicial power,
harnessing the strengths of the existing formalist and functionalist tests to
ameliorate their respective weaknesses. In this way purposive formalism presents
a preferred method by which judicial independence and impartiality may be best 
achieved.
V  CONCLUSION
This article has considered how Chapter III may be interpreted to best achieve
the independence and impartiality of the federal judiciary. The Australian context 
supports this kind of assessment for a number of reasons. Firstly, the lack of 
clear guidance from the framers of the Constitution leaves the High Court with
considerable room for discretion in its interpretations of Chapter III. Secondly,
there remains a general consensus that the separation of judicial power derived 
from Chapter III is designed to achieve judicial independence and impartiality
through which a range of other constitutional values may be attained. Thirdly,
Australia is in the intriguing position of having parallel streams of formalist and 
functionalist separation of judicial powers jurisprudence. 
Building on these observations, this article assessed the success of the formalist 
separation rules and functionalist incompatibility test in achieving judicial
independence and impartiality. In undertaking this analysis, some — perhaps
Monash University Law Review (Vol 39, No 1)104
unexpected — truths have been faced. Despite elevating judicial independence
and integrity to a determinative level, the functionalist incompatibility test has
proved an inadequate mechanism for achieving the core aims of Chapter III.
The failure of the incompatibility test to live up to its potential is argued not to
simply refl ect the idiosyncratic approaches of justices interpreting the test, as
may be alleged.198 Rather, the rapid weakening of the incompatibility standard 
demonstrates the incremental erosion of the separation of powers that formalists
regularly attribute to functionalist approaches. This erosion stems from the
permissiveness and fl exibility that characterises all functionalist tests. 
The considerable defi ciencies in the formalist separation rules have also been
discussed. Formalism’s primary assertion that judicial power is susceptible to
precise defi nition is fundamentally fl awed. It is true some powers are capable of 
defi nition as judicial or non-judicial, but many are not. In these latter cases the
High Court has adopted an inconsistent range of techniques to resolve the Chapter 
III issue. In doing so, it has been constrained by the separation rules’ blinkered 
focus on defi nitional characteristics. Thus to resolve Chapter III questions courts
have problematically stretched and contorted the characteristics of judicial power,
drawn inconsistently upon history, loose analogies and parliamentary intent, and 
created controversial classes of exceptional powers capable of being vested in
multiple branches of government. Moreover, formalism’s implicit assertion that 
the allocation of powers according to defi nition will naturally achieve judicial
independence and impartiality is unsound. This is demonstrated by the awkward,
inconsistent and ultimately unsatisfactory place of basic fair process protections
within the separation rules framework.
These critical observations underpin a proposed way forward in the interpretation
of Chapter III, beginning with a pragmatic acknowledgment of the weaknesses
in both the formalist and functionalist approaches. This proposed solution is
purposive formalism. Purposive formalism is a two-tiered test that harnesses the
strengths of the formalist separation rules and the functionalist incompatibility
test to ameliorate the weaknesses inherent in each approach. 
By grounding itself in the formalist approach and giving primacy to defi nitional
factors in determining the allocation of powers, purposive formalism avoids the
permissiveness and fl exibility of the functionalist method and the incremental
erosion of judicial independence resulting from these traits. But purposive
formalism accepts that over-estimating the precision with which functions may
be defi ned undermines the effi cacy and ultimate utility of the formalist rules.
In cases in which the characteristics of judicial power are simply insuffi cient 
to fulfi l the task of defi nition purposive formalism only permits a power to be
vested in courts if it is demonstrably compatible with judicial independence
and impartiality. Importantly this ‘compatibility limb’ is a secondary tier of 
the inquiry and presumes a power may not be conferred until demonstrated to
be compatible. This distinguishes purposive formalism from the functionalist 
198 Bateman, above n 81, 442.
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incompatibility test, which permits the conferral of a power in the absence of 
demonstrated incompatibility. 
The purposive formalist approach is a signifi cant development in the interpretation
of Chapter III to achieve judicial independence and impartiality. It at once
harnesses the strengths and addresses the weaknesses of the existing tests in their 
capacities to achieve the core aim of Chapter III. To some extent this analysis
fi ts within a far broader literature dealing with the complex relationship between
rules and their justifi cations.199 The approach acknowledges the need for a strict 
yet principled mechanism for allocating the powers of government. It attempts to
address the tension between rules and their purposes, albeit in the very limited 
context of the allocation of powers on Australian federal courts. By elevating a
purposive compatibility inquiry to a clear position within the Chapter III validity
test, purposive formalism clarifi es the place and relevance of other considerations,
such as historic analogy and parliamentary intent. Perhaps most importantly,
purposive formalism compels courts to be more open and accountable about their 
approach, in particular with respect to the principled purposive considerations
that do and should play a part in Chapter III reasoning. 
There is no panacea for the ills that plague the interpretation of Chapter III. Every
approach will suffer some frailty. Despite the risks, purposive formalism has much
to commend it, not as an ideal but certainly as a preferred approach. By combining
the strengths of the separation rules and incompatibility test in a tiered design it 
ameliorates the weaknesses of each approach. In doing so purposive formalism
delivers a more robust protection for judicial independence and impartiality and 
presents a signifi cant step forward in interpreting Chapter III in a manner that is
consistent with its objects and purposes. By reconceptualising the interpretation
of Chapter III, purposive formalism calls for a re-examination of earlier cases and 
a reinvigorated Chapter III jurisprudence more clearly concerned with achieving
core constitutional aims within the strong formalist framework. 
199 See Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-
Making in Law and in Life (Clarendon Press, 1991) 73–85; Hart, above n 59; Lon L Fuller, ‘Positivism
and Fidelity to Law — A Reply to Professor Hart’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 630; P S Atiyah and 
R S Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law: A Comparative Study of Legal Reasoning, 
Legal Theory, and Legal Institutions (Clarendon Press, 1987).
